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 The purpose of this work is to engage in an analysis of political rhetorical 
strategies that invoke phrases such as the “silent majority” and “identity politics” in order 
to understand how these strategies operate logically, how they figure and define the 
“political” in the context of contemporary American politics, and what effects they have 
on minoritized subjects and their political labor. In this work, I place these strategies in 
an historical context of ongoing sociopolitical dominance by white, hetero-normative, 
and cis-normative ideologies with special attention given to the turn-of-the-century 
eugenics movement and its rhetorical operations. I engage in an extended analysis of 
these strategies and their historical and contemporary contexts through a series of close 
readings of political texts that theorize with, through, and against, including an historical 
white supremacist text that theorizes a political sphere based on the will of the 
“majority,” a contemporary monograph that claims “identity politics” poses a threat to 
the “properly political,” and the Combahee River Collective, a Black feminist manifesto 
that coined the term “identity politics” and uses it to both engage with and interrogate the 
“political.” By engaging with these texts, I hope to demonstrate that the visions of the 
“political” these texts map out are not inconsequential or dismissible as mere “strategy.” 
To the contrary, they constitute serious theorizations of what the “political” is and thus 
need to be critically engaged with in order to understand how the “political” is imagined 
and re-imagined through the deployment and re-deployment of these strategies.
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CHAPTER I 
POLITICS AND THE MAJORITARIAN IMAGINATION 
In online discussions based in social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Tumblr, and Reddit, among others, adages citing various “laws” of mainstream discourse 
or parlance are coined by users to highlight both their specific sheer frequency of use and 
the general lamentable predictability of particular tropes rearing their head in a political 
discussion. Examples of these phrases include “Godwin’s Law,” which states that the 
longer a discussion continues, the more likely a comparison to Hitler or the Nazis will be 
invoked, and “Lovejoy’s Law,” which refers to the seemingly inevitable appeal along the 
lines of “please think of the children” (“Urban Dictionary,” 2018). What these satirical 
phrases do is mark a particularly tired invocation of a rhetorical trope and draw attention 
to the ways in which political discourse is overdetermined by a handful of images or 
concepts that one almost always invokes in any given exchange of ideas within that 
discourse. These are terms that express a certain frustration on the part of the user, a 
frustration with constantly having to labor with trite abstractions used to justify sloppy or 
lazy thinking. It is, ultimately, a frustration with the displacement of thought that these 
invocations provoke, a displacement that always leads back to an order of concepts that 
seems to constantly haunt political thinking. 
I, too, am frustrated in a similar way, but there is no clever, disaffected proverb 
that encapsulates or even approximates this frustration. This is the frustration I feel when
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someone tells me they are supporting or celebrating a public figure’s lack of “political 
correctness” in what they believe to be a bold defense of the values of “free speech.” This 
is the frustration I feel when I am told that concepts like “proper pronouns” and 
“intersectionality” are simply too divisive, too jargony, too elitist, and too theoretical to 
warrant critical engagement. This is the frustration I feel when white liberals lament that 
their party has been overrun by “identity politics,” costing them elections and causing 
them embarrassment. This is the frustration I feel in response to the heavy-handed 
reminders to not forget the “majority” when preparing public appearances and the wide-
eyed bewilderment that flows forth when I articulate that my project is specifically not 
one that is concerned with the “majority.” This archive of frustration, containing tense 
discussions behind office doors, rolled eyes in the classroom, condescending sighs from 
faculty members, and hushed words whispered down the hallway or typed behind a bright 
screen, is what brings me to this project. 
These frustrations and the tropes that incite them seem to haunt me perpetually. 
They are one of the reasons I left political science and pursued research in the field of 
gender studies. They are the reason I wrote my undergraduate capstone paper on the 
concept of “political correctness” and how it operates as a rhetorical strategy. They are 
the reason I remain ever-skeptical about appeals to the majority, to “common sense,” and 
to not use jargon. They are the reason I react so strongly to suggestions to not saddle the 
political with the petty, excessive concerns of mere identity when there are more pressing 
issues that actually affect people within the nation, like the concerns of the majority or 
“bread-and-butter” issues, and outside the nation, where other Others suffer more 
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authentically, implying that no one with geopolitical proximity to the majority (in other 
words, anyone who is seen to reap the spoils of majority-led civil society) can 
legitimately claim harm and a shared sense of consciousness around that harm. 
Furthermore, these frustrations have led me to question why the articulations so often 
read as “identity politics” and “political correctness” are seen as actual, material threats to 
the political and/or the political life of the majority rather than as simply one more 
viewpoint to be managed in an idealized pluralistic democratic system. 
It seems to be, given these tropes and their continued currency in political 
discourse, that we are always either just prior to or just following a moment in which we 
will have gone “too far” in accommodating or promoting identity as a mode of politics, 
meaning that the political is or will be irreversibly harmed. Generally, those invoking 
those concepts, explicitly or implicitly, position themselves as a lone voice of reason in a 
chorus of irrationality that is driving us towards this ever-approaching political horizon 
and that they mean no harm but are simply concerned with what is about to happen when 
we finally “go too far.”  
For example, on December 8th, 2017, Congressman Steve King, a representative 
from Iowa, tweeted a link to a website called “The Voice of Europe” with the caption 
“diversity is not our strength” and a quote from a Hungarian politician that suggested that 
“mixing cultures” was a detriment to the quality of life within a nation. King followed up 
the controversy around his tweet by declaring that “American Assimilation has been the 
envy of the world. Bring back American Assimilation,” positioning his statements as 
commentary on the “too far” pluralism of contemporary society (CNN, 2017; 
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Friedersdorf, 2017). King previously made statements such as “We can't restore our 
civilization with somebody else's babies,” and remarked that such statements were not 
racist, but simply concerned with “our stock, our country, our culture, our civilization” 
(CNN, 2017). 
It is remarkable how such a simple set of statements perform such a significant 
binarization, juxtaposing “diversity” against “strength” and “assimilation” alongside the 
latter. The implication, of course, is that homogeneity of “stock” as King calls it is strong 
and that there is a legitimate interest in regulating the level of “diversity” in a population. 
Furthermore, such a statement relies on a crucial underlying claim about politics: that the 
political “us” that is spoken for in the statement is in need of protection from a possibly 
lethal contagion that threatens the well-being of the proper body politic. The “us” in 
question, and its assumed political hegemony, is fragile and in need of active 
preservation. “Diversity” and the potential of being outnumbered is constantly in 
question; this is what I believe people like King mean when they continuously position 
the political on a precipice of about-to-be too far away from some value like assimilation. 
The implications of such statements are interesting because they seem to reject the notion 
that a “diverse” population can be a strong and legitimate foundation for a political 
system. In other words, if a “diverse” population were to grow and outnumber the “stock” 
that King refers to, the resulting political scene would be illegitimate, despite the fact that 
the “diverse” outnumbering the “we” should, in theory, result in a legitimate shift in 
political power according to the logic of majority rule. The dominant “we” and its 
permanent ascendancy is then necessary for preserving the political in this understanding; 
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in a system where political power is assumed to come from numbers of people, the 
implication is “we have the right to outnumber you.” 
The idea of the loss of true, mathematical majority status for the “we” in question 
is not merely limited to the concept of immigration, which King was referring to in his 
statement. Majoritarian paranoia seeps into all kinds of political and ethical discussions. 
For example, some supporters of President Donald Trump have complained that a 
majority of individuals in Robert Mueller’s federal grand jury are Black and that such a 
jury could not possibly act in an objective way due to this makeup (Delk, 2018). A 
prominent conspiracy theory claiming that gay men were recruiting young boys to 
become homosexuals and support the “gay agenda” lives on in a new form, in the 
painting of transgender individuals as dangerous people with a mental illness who want 
to infect otherwise “normal” children (YouGov, 2017). The “fourteen words,” a popular 
statement of support for white supremacy, invokes the need to “secure” a white future for 
white children (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.). White hegemony is, by the logic of this 
statement, fragile and in need of saving, and is apparently numeric, based on the impetus 
to reproduce. The fear of being outnumbered, becoming a minority, losing hegemony 
status, and perhaps being subject to the violence that comes with minority-status (even as 
that violence is downplayed or ignored completely) lurks in these frightful imaginings. 
The necessity of a white, citizen, cisgender, and heterosexual constituency for the proper 
reproduction of the political is key; what binds all of these statements and logics is that a 
political arising from any other type of constituency would be illogical, immoral, and 
illegitimate. The political is synonymous with some form of hegemony guided by the 
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only truly proper political subjects; anything else is a dire and dangerous discrepancy. To 
put it another way, the minority threatens the legitimate order of the majority through 
biological, political and/or cultural reproduction. 
The assumption that the majority should be the driving impetus that forms and 
legitimizes the political seems relatively innocuous. However, there is a logical slippage 
apparent in the use of the word “majority” here. Majority, in purely mathematical terms, 
is fifty per cent plus one unit, which means, theoretically, that whatever group meets this 
criterion should have the power to influence and guide the political realm. However, the 
“majority” imagined by the preceding sources documented in the previous paragraphs is 
not simply quantitative, it is also qualitative. The claim is not only that a minority is 
unduly influencing what should be the governance of the majority, but also that the 
possibility of the majority becoming the minority is, in itself, illegitimate. The majority, 
then, as it is rhetorically imagined, has certain identifiable qualities and assumable 
political positions. Whether or not this majority is actually a mathematical majority is 
irrelevant; the majority here is believed to have a permanent claim to determining and 
indeed producing the political. This subtle routing of qualitative judgements through the 
parlance of the quantitative demonstrates a desire to make this logic less visible to 
critique. How can you argue against the majority in a majority-rule system, after all? 
However, such routing also reveals the very precarious nature of this particular strain of 
reasoning in that this slippage is so central to its functioning. 
The anxieties I have described recall similar fears that motivated the development 
and implementation of eugenics programs at the turn of the twentieth century. 
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Eugenicists feared that the a more pure and superior group (Western European 
descendants) was threatened biologically and existentially by an inferior group (racial 
minorities) through breeding and resource depletion. Part of the reason I find marking 
this rhetoric of the “majority” so important is that this act of marking will make it 
possible to trace historical lines from current to past rhetorical patterns. Identifying these 
broader patterns will add historical depth to my research and also allow me to connect 
what I am calling the “rhetoric of the majority” to other ideologies of domination, such as 
systemic racism. In fact, many traits and arguments made by self-identified white 
supremacists in the United States can be traced back to a book called The Dispossessed 
Majority, a burgeoning six-hundred-page tome published in 1972 that explicitly links 
eugenics-era concerns with biological devastation of the white race to the rhetoric of the 
“majority” and the potential for the rightly ascendant white majority in the United States 
to be usurped by aggressive minority groups. 
While invocation of the “majority,” alongside “political correctness” and “identity 
politics” may seem to be more common on the political right, it would be very inaccurate 
to categorize these rhetorical patterns as occurring exclusively within right-wing or 
“conservative” discourses. To the contrary, many on the left have invoked similar to 
near-identical critiques of those on the right. These critiques follow similar rhetorical 
patterns and link the “failure” of the political left in the United States to an excessive 
focus on the politics of “identity.” Mark Lilla, whose essay “The End of Identity 
Liberalism” enjoyed wide circulation on both the left and right, states that “American 
liberalism has slipped into a kind of moral panic about racial, gender and sexual identity 
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that has distorted liberalism’s message” (Lilla, 2016). Bill Maher, long-time political 
comedian who generally identifies with the American left echoed this sentiment, telling 
Democrats to “ease up on the identity politics” and that they should “make sure you look 
like you represent everybody, including the majority” (Mazza, 2017) In a similar 
although more subtle statement, Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders stated 
that “a strategy that’s just micro-targeting particular, discrete groups in a Democratic 
coalition sometimes will win you elections, but it’s not going to win you the broad 
mandate that you need” (Griffiths, 2016). These critiques, which explicitly and implicitly 
invoke “identity politics” and the “majority” in similar ways, parallel with similar claims 
on the right. My purpose in marking these statements and patterns on both the right and 
the left is to draw attention to the way what I am calling the “rhetoric of the majority” 
works across the ideological spectrum and in fact frames most liberal ideological 
conceptions and claims of what constitutes “politics.” 
To clarify, my intention in highlighting these patterns is not to suggest that 
political approaches that center “identity” or “diversity” are unproblematic or represent a 
“better” political ideal. As scholars such as Sara Ahmed have argued, the language of 
“diversity” can be and has been adopted uncritically in institutions within the United 
States as a way to obfuscate systemic racism and white supremacy (2012). Rather, what I 
want to draw attention to is how the marking of certain issues, ideas, and people as 
participating in “identity politics” operates as a mode of minoritization. The broader 
interventions I want to make by observing, marking, and engaging with these rhetorical 
patterns is to provoke a recognition of the taken-for-granted assumptions that underlie our 
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thinking of the “political,” a rethinking of what constitutes proper “politics,” and how 
such a rethinking can be and is already being practiced by politically constituted 
communities. These interventions reflect the academic passions that drew me from 
political science to women’s and gender studies. Furthermore, I believe that, given the 
current political landscape, the imperative to rethink and recognize already existing 
rethinkings of “politics” grows exponentially with each passing day.  
This thesis will be part of a continuing, long-form, academic project that focuses 
on what exactly the political is, how it is imagined, and how political subjects, 
particularly those who are not perceived to be part of the “majority,” relate to the 
political, or more explicitly, experience the political as a relationship to the state and 
what/who the state claims to represent and stand in for. This specific work will 
concentrate on the rhetorical logics, assumptions, and tropes that guide the political, what 
ideologies they can be traced to, and how they function both historically and in the 
contemporary political moment. Specific questions that guide my work include: Who gets 
to claim “majority” status and how do these claims operate rhetorically? What motivates 
these claims and why are such claims seen as politically important and/or strategic? How 
do they configure and map political relationships? Are these claims connected in any way 
to dominant patterns of thought regarding race and identity? What movements use these 
claims to organize, and why do they choose to use them? Why are some social issues 
perceived as “identity politics” rather than politics proper? How do understandings of 
“identity politics” intersect with the concept of the “majority”? Who do these 
understandings serve and who do they harm? What do these understandings tell us about 
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dominant conceptions of the “political”? Why is the politics of identity considered to be 
excessive, jargon, or overly theoretical? How have “minorities” grappled with and 
responded to these rhetorical strategies and logics? Can we think of politics as something 
other than a relationship to the majority? What can “identity politics” make possible? 
What can it foreclose on? 
 I find these questions important and compelling because of the ways in which 
identity affects one’s participation in the political and how one’s political labor comes to 
be read in certain ways if that labor is performed in or perceived to be performed in the 
name of identity. Furthermore, I find it necessary to closely examine and deconstruct the 
political logics that structure how minorities come to be understood as such and that limit 
or proscribe certain modes of being and participation in the political, even those that 
claim to do so on behalf of “progressive” or leftist causes. In doing so, I hope to unsettle 
these logics, show how they operate so convincingly, and hopefully provide a starting 
point for thinking about politics and the political in different ways. 
 The questions I want to pursue in this research project concern the intersections of 
political science, history, philosophy, and rhetoric. In asking these questions, I want to 
engage in a conversation with these fields and also facilitate conversation between these 
fields, as they have not always articulated explicit connections between themselves. As I 
weave in and out of these fields as a researcher, I hope to both perform the important 
work of intersectional and holistic analysis while also expanding the potential for 
connections between disciplines that are often walled off from one another in the 
university. Furthermore, I hope to demonstrate that the work these fields do is, in fact, not 
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mutually exclusive to their respective “disciplines” and that the conceptions of these 
fields as such is part of a larger pattern of thinking that pervades contemporary discourse 
on the issues of “identity.” 
My primary method of analysis in this text will be the close reading of primary 
sources related to my questions and secondary sources that can offer clarification, 
context, or further understanding of those sources. I have intentionally chosen to focus 
primarily on the source texts, giving them the bulk of my attention rather than conducting 
extensive reviews of secondary literature. Focusing specifically and closely on these texts 
is important because they are the kinds of texts that rarely receive scholarly attention, 
despite the work they do in theorizing a vision of the political, even if that is not their 
expressed goal. My readings are informed by post-structuralist philosophy, critical race 
theory, critical ethnic studies, political science, and feminist theory. 
Each of the three chapters addresses a theme that emerges from the larger 
questions I am provoking in my research. The second chapter of this thesis will provide a 
historical basis for the questions I am asking. This will consist of reviewing the rhetoric 
of the “majority” in modern politics, with special attention to the rhetoric of Richard 
Nixon and a text called The Dispossessed Majority by Wilmot Robertson, a white 
supremacist. In addition to identifying the rhetorical patterns and strategies used in these 
texts, I investigate the connection the rhetoric of the majority may have with the rhetoric 
of eugenics and how the rhetorical moves made by these discrete bodies of work perform 
similar kinds of political mapping. 
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 The third chapter of this thesis will focus primarily on contemporary events and 
invocations of the “majority” and how these invocations are connected to the discourse of 
“identity politics.” In this chapter, my primary site of analysis will be Mark Lilla’s book 
The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics, in which he argues for an end to 
“identity politics” in favor of an emphasis on commonality. In analyzing this text, I argue 
that the logic that Lilla uses to understand the nature of politics is quite similar to the 
logics of eugenics and the majority as established in the previous chapter. 
 The fourth chapter offers a brief critique of some iterations of “identity politics” 
that actually wind up doing work similar to Lilla’s and not, as he claims, actually 
challenging or putting forth an alternative understanding of the political. I will also turn 
to the Combahee River Collective Statement and Harney and Moten’s The 
Undercommons as sites of political reimagining that gesture towards the radical potential 
of an “identity politics” that actually remakes and re-theorizes both identity and politics 
rather than deploying them together in a non-specific and indiscriminate way. To 
conclude, I will briefly re-visit the “archive of frustration” that I invoked at the beginning 
of the thesis and reflect on what my work on this thesis means for ongoing academic 
conversations and for my own personal lived experience as someone who will likely be 
understood as doing “identity politics” for the rest of their life.
13 
 
CHAPTER II 
THE EUGENIC LIFE OF THE SILENT MAJORITY 
The first full definition of “politics” in the Merriam-Webster dictionary is “the art 
of science of government,” along with two supplementary extensions, one that adds 
“concerned with guiding or influencing governmental policy” and another that adds 
“concerned with winning and holding control over a government” (Merriam-Webster, 
n.d.). Although I suspect that this definition is primary because it is the one most readably 
legible and acceptable to many individuals, I find it quite narrow and troubling in that it 
seems to collapse what may be more accurately called “governance” with “politics,” 
which I approach as a much broader term. The fifth and final definition that Merriam-
Webster provides is “the total complex of relations between people living in society,” 
which is closer to how I envision and deploy the term (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). I see the 
work of politics as the delineation and mapping of that “total complex of relations.”  
As elaborated in the introduction of this thesis, the majority/minority binary is one 
example of this type of work. By understanding ourselves in relationship to the signifiers 
“majority” and “minority,” we are mapped by them, making ourselves legible to one 
another based on these terms and the subsequent vocabularies and signifying chains that 
these terms give rise to. To put it another way, politics is the process by which signifiers 
cut into that complex assemblage of social relations to make it meaningful for both the
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actors involved in those relations and the entities that claim to manage those relations (the 
state). By becoming described by “majority” or “minority,” for example, we 
communicate who we are in relation to one another and we acquire political value in 
relationship to the state. What I am interested in exploring in this chapter is what kinds of 
knowledge and knowing come to inform these political signifiers and how they come to 
be understood as the most natural or logical way of mapping the political. 
Furthermore, I am interested in understanding how these framings of the political 
come to account for what/who is and what/who isn’t permitted to participate in or exist 
the political. In other words, how some presences (“diversity,” for example, in Steve 
King’s comments mentioned in the introduction) come to be seen as a threat to the 
political order. I am interested in this not only because it seems to be such a common 
rhetorical move, but also because it implies that politics is essentially a negative 
operation concerned with the subtraction of certain concepts or bodies affixed with 
political signifiers from that larger “complex of relations” in order to better those 
relations. To put it another way, I am interested in how some people become affixed with 
political labels in such a way that they become perceived as political issues to be solved, 
managed, and/or eliminated.  
 To address these questions, I will be moving between research on political 
history, contemporary political science, analyses of political rhetoric, and concepts from 
critical race theory that elaborate on how certain patterns of life and living come to be 
seen as natural, why others come to be seen as degraded and unnatural, and what abilities 
and privileges are afforded based on proximity to an “optimal” way of living. In doing so, 
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I hope to address critical lacuna in the field of political science that comes from 
disciplinary segregation and the refusal to consider how theoretical concepts from critical 
race theory can illuminate larger political struggles and processes. 
To begin this chapter I will first review the turn-of-the-century eugenics 
movement by sketching a brief history of the movement and giving special attention to 
how eugenics operated rhetorically. In this analysis, I argue that the political was mapped 
in eugenics rhetorics by tying social ills to the reproduction of the “unfit,” defining three 
key features of eugenics rhetoric that guide how it marks bodies and moves between 
differing discourses. In addition to reviewing this history and rhetorical functions of 
eugenics, I also move to situate eugenics as a node in the larger pattern of race-based 
control based on what Sylvia Wynter terms as the dominance of “Man” as a genre of 
human.  
To follow, I will trace the concept of the endangered political majority to the 
presidential campaign of Richard Nixon, who developed and strategically deployed the 
“silent majority” as a rhetorical tactic to activate a segment of the population that was 
hostile to minority forces. The phrase “silent majority” has remained a force in politics 
and has informed further developments in political rhetoric. After briefly sketching and 
analyzing Nixon’s use of the “silent majority” trope and considering the place assigned to 
it in contemporary political science, I will consider how its rhetoric and logic maps the 
political in a similar and analogous way to the eugenics movement, mirroring its three 
key features.  
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Finally, I will pursue a textual analysis of Wilmot Robson’s The Dispossessed 
Majority, a white supremacist tome which articulates racialist theories that draw on the 
legacy of eugenics rhetoric while also speculating about the potential mobilization of a 
racially pure “American Majority” political unit. In this section, I argue that Robertson’s 
text not only theorizes the rhetoric of eugenics and the majority together, but shows that 
they indeed must be theorized together. To conclude I reflect on what these analyses 
mean for the broader political questions I am pursuing in this thesis. 
 
Eugenics, Rhetoric, and Political Mapping 
The first recorded use of “eugenics” was in the year 1883, when it was coined by 
English scientist Francis Galton (Painter, 2011). The word came from the Greek eugenes, 
which combined eu- (good) and genos (birth) and was defined by Galton as the “doctrine 
of progress in evolution of the human race.” Although the word “eugenics” was not 
formally created until 1883, the legacy of eugenic ideas stretches back much farther, with 
some of the earliest claims to inherited criminal social traits going back as far as 1783 
(Painter, 2011). Ironically, the earliest manifestations of proto-eugenic thought aimed to 
explain and biologize intra-racial differences as opposed to inter-racial differences.  
Richard Dugdale, an English scientist, published a scientific report in 1877 
claiming to link criminal traits to defective heredity (Painter, 2011). Dugdale’s research, 
carried out on prison inmates, claimed that the reproduction of a class he called the 
“jukes” caused a phenomenon known as “degenerate families” which would be taken up 
by racial thinkers to explain the lifestyles of poor whites that did not fit in with theories 
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of white superiority and ascendancy (Painter, 2011, pp. 4095–4127). The success of 
Dugdale’s publication would go on to inspire more radical applications of hereditarian 
thinking. A New York social reformer, Josephine Lowell, began to advocate for a 
coercive state system to prevent the “diseased and vicious” from reproducing based on 
Dugdale’s research, even though Dugdale was not completely convinced that 
environmental strategies could counteract bad hereditary inheritance (Painter, 2011, p. 
4148). The idea that the control of reproduction was direly needed to preserve the white 
race by pruning it of so-called “degenerate” inheritances would spread from the 
Progressive movement to religious leaders such as Oscar McCulloch, to figures in the 
pacifist movement, such as David Jordan, to mainstream political leaders, such as 
President Teddy Roosevelt (Painter, 2011). All of these thinkers and leaders were 
profoundly concerned with the supposed growing degeneracy of the white race, 
specifically in regards to the traits and lifestyles of poor whites. These intertwining lines 
of thought between different individuals and movements would begin to mobilize 
eugenics from thought into action, with state-sponsored sterilization beginning in 1907 in 
Indiana, with more widespread acceptance as social policy in the 1920s (Lombardo, 
2011; Painter, 2011). 
During the 1920s, the trend in eugenic thinking began to move farther away from 
treating the supposed degeneracies within the white race and started to move towards 
addressing other “degenerate” races and the threats they posed through breeding with 
whites. In 1923, psychology professor Carl Brigham declared that “racial admixture” 
with Blacks was a leading cause of racial degeneration (Roberts, 1998, pp. 63–64). This 
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sentiment was echoed that same year in the publication of The Passing of the Great Race 
by Madison Grant, a New York anthropologist, which argued that the decline of the 
Nordic race could be linked to interbreeding with Blacks and inferior immigrant groups 
(Roberts, 1998).  Although the Great Depression dampened the circulation of eugenic 
thought temporarily in the United States, it was kept afloat by the Nazis in Germany and 
by the emerging birth control movement in the United States (Kendi, 2016). During this 
time, Margret Sanger, leader of the birth control movement, reframed birth control from a 
radical feminist stance of self-determination to a eugenic necessity that would stave off 
the impending “race suicide” caused by differences in reproduction (Roberts, 1998, p. 
72). While still focused on the degeneracy of poor whites to some degree, the turn in 
eugenics towards those outside of the white race (and thus the displacement of racial 
anxiety onto a biologically distinct other) had important social consequences. Birth 
control clinics in the South began aggressively pushing birth control and sterilization onto 
Black populations, and by 1940, thirty states banned interracial marriage (Roberts, 1998). 
After World War II, the eugenics movement in the West began to suffer due to the 
role eugenics thought played in the Holocaust. However, even as eugenics was formally 
“dethroned” by scientists, politicians, and organizations such as the United Nations, the 
perpetuation of eugenic-like ideas continued to spread and be deployed by various 
individuals and institutions (Kendi, 2016). Indeed, as I hope to draw attention to in this 
project, the “formal” life of eugenic rhetoric in the first half of the twentieth century was 
but one node in the long history of white supremacist thought, one that is preceded and 
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succeeded by other strains of rhetoric that borrow much from this particular theorizing of 
racism. 
Sylvia Wynter’s work concerning different genres of human and the 
overdetermination of “Man” as the sole genre of the human is helpful to contextualize 
and situate eugenics and the logic it is based on within the longer history of racial 
domination. Wynter writes that the primary contemporary socio-political struggle will be 
over “securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass… conception of the human, Man, 
which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-
being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species 
itself/ourselves” (2003, p. 260). In her analysis, Wynter traces the development of Man as 
a particular genre of human throughout history and its ascent to hegemonic status, where 
it is presently considered the only viable genre or way of being human (2003). In other 
words, the current Eurocentric and ethnocentric ideal of what it means to be a human is 
not the way of being, but merely one of many genres of being that has attained 
hegemonic status due to the global expansion of the West and the dominant ethnoclass. 
Wynter writes that the concept of race and, subsequently, the subhuman, was necessary to 
legitimate and maintain the supremacy of Man. She writes that 
 
…it was this construct [race] that would enable the now globally expanding West 
to replace the earlier mortal/immortal, natural/supernatural, human/the ancestors, 
the gods/God distinction as the one on whose basis all human groups had 
millennially “grounded” their descriptive statement/prescriptive statements of 
what it is to be human, and to reground its secularizing own on a newly projected 
human/subhuman distinction instead…“Race” was therefore to be, in effect, the 
nonsupernatural but no less extrahuman ground (in the reoccupied place of the 
traditional ancestors/gods, God, ground) of the answer that the secularizing West 
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would now give to the Heideggerian question as to the who, and the what we are. 
(2003, p. 264) 
 
 
Race as a concept was necessary to maintain previously supernaturally delimited 
boundaries of being and humanity and its adoption represents but one event in the larger 
history of the human.  
Wynter’s attention to race as a phenomenon situated within a larger process of 
subjugation is exactly why her analysis is helpful for understanding eugenics and its 
rhetorical functioning. In a similar way, eugenics is a phenomenon occurring within a 
larger process of racial subjugation. Eugenics, then, is a technology of race and thus also 
a technology of genres; it is the biological overdetermination of a narrow genre of human 
(namely, a white, Nordic, and Eurocentric human) that strives for the elimination of other 
genres of being. Wynter’s work aids in contextualizing eugenics as a singular expression 
of a long history of the drive to control human genres while also allowing for the 
consideration of eugenics as an evolving expression that necessarily shifts and changes in 
response to its socio-political environment. 
Given the broad historical trajectory of the eugenics movement and the even 
broader context of race-based domination that Wynter’s work highlights, settling on a 
singular definition of what eugenics is can potentially be quite problematic As the 
preceding paragraphs demonstrate, eugenics changed and fluctuated fairly frequently, 
evolving from a concern with white degeneracy to the infiltration of the white race by 
other inferior races and social groups while also occurring within a bigger context and 
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history of racial domination. To craft a more holistic understanding of eugenics for this 
project, a different approach to defining the term is necessary. 
Marouf Hasian writes that eugenics is an “evocative term that could be employed 
in a myriad of ways” (1996, p. 29). In his review of scientific literature, Hasian found no 
less than eight different definitions for eugenics, covering a wide range from improving 
the health of a race and nation to a more lasseiz-faire framing of “scientific philanthropy” 
(1996, pp. 28–29). All of the definitions, however, relate explicitly to the field of science 
concerned with genetic betterment and a population that is assumed to be in need of said 
genetic betterment. That being said, it is clear that the use of eugenics exceeded even this 
wide swath of definitions by traveling outside of the realms of explicit science. Hasian 
also writes that eugenics contains “rhetorical fragments, representing the ideologies of 
multitudes of social actors who at different historical junctures have reconfigured these 
ideographs to legitimate a plethora of political, social, and economic agendas” (1996, pp. 
22–23). Given this observation along with Wynter’s analysis, it seems necessary to 
construct a definition of eugenics that can account for the myriad ways in which eugenic 
rhetorics travel and morph into different social, political, and epistemological contests. 
To briefly recap, eugenics had a varied life during the time of its widespread 
adoption in the first half of the twentieth century, is part of a larger structures and process 
of racial domination in connection to a project of human genres, and travels outside of 
science rhetorically and adapts to cultural, political, and economic agendas. Due to all of 
these factors, I find that to try and determine a singular definition for what eugenics and 
its rhetoric is would be to reduce its inherent complexities and penchant for adoption. 
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Hasian’s work notes that while the exact meanings of eugenics are “diverse and often 
contradictory” and frequently context-dependent, pursuing an analysis that highlights 
functional patterns is worthwhile and important (1996, p. 23). Thus, I would like to 
propose then that a more useful approach for this project would be to highlight what 
eugenic rhetoric does. By creating a framework for understanding eugenics as the 
relationship between discrete but intertwined and mutually constitutive processes, I hope 
to maintain and represent the animacy and operations of the concept rather than settling 
for a static definition that may only reflect a narrow expression of eugenic processes.  
The first key function of eugenic rhetoric is the binarizing of individuals into two 
distinct groups: proper and improper humans. Eugenics maps the abstract notions of 
"pure" and "impure" onto differing groups of bodies. In her study of eugenics and 
nationalism, Nancy Ordover observes that  
 
in constructing entire racialized categories of demonized others, eugenicists put 
forth an ideologically purified America – purged of past sins and guarded against 
future menace. The eugenics project revolved around imagining the nation: what 
it was (now threatened) and what it might be (with and without government and 
medical intervention). It was the sort of creative visualization that demanded both 
historical revisionism and ominous prophecy. (2003, p. 7) 
 
 
Through the mapping and constructing of “demonized others”, eugenics produces the 
notion of a "proper" group of people or genre of human upon which society or 
civilization rests. In other words, "pure" groups are more advanced and thus fit to lead or 
establish society than "impure" groups. This is what Ordover calls the “imagining” of the 
nation and what the nation could be if impurities are removed from the body politic. In 
this understanding of biology, identity, and the nation, the reproduction of society as we 
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know it is contingent upon the biological reproduction of those who have inherited the 
proper biological genre, as Wynter would call it; all others represent a continuous threat 
to the purity of the dominant genre and thus the continuation of proper society. The 
rhetorical mapping that this logic relies on is a deceptively simple binary of pure and 
impure legitimates the regulation, surveillance, and eventual destruction of groups 
deemed as threats to the "proper" through sterilization and forceful assimilation. 
The second key function of eugenic rhetorics is to move outside of its original 
home in pure science and assemble with other bodies of knowledge. As elaborated in the 
previous paragraphs, eugenics and its rhetoric are fluid and not constrained to any one 
body of knowledge or political issue or vocabulary. Eugenic rhetoric can assemble with 
many bodies of knowledge and even seemingly contradictory political issues or parties. 
Ordover credits the long and continuing legacy of eugenics and eugenic rhetoric to its 
status as a “scavenger ideology” that plays on anxieties over assumed immutable 
differences and its “capacity to both absorb and be absorbed by other ideologies and 
political agendas” (2003, pp. 3, 207). Hasian’s rhetorical study confirms this, as he notes 
that eugenics is not only the “creation of a coterie of pseudoscientists” but also a 
collection of “rhetorical fragments” that have been effectively popularized and refitted 
for various political purposes and popular media (1996, pp. 22–23). For example, 
Dorothy Roberts’ work analyzes the deployment of eugenics rhetoric and metaphors by 
Margaret Sanger in order to promote the use of contraceptives (1998). Roberts writes that 
while Sanger’s intentions were initially allied with the idea of female self-determination, 
her use of eugenics as a frame for her campaign allowed her to tie contraception to the 
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well-being of the nation (1998, p. 58). Eugenics was as much a political strategy here as 
it was a scientific claim; Roberts writes that “The language of eugenics, moreover, gave 
scientific credence to the movement’s claim that birth control was an aspect of public 
health and improved the national welfare” (1998, p. 72). Ordover also notes in her study 
that eugenics was also deployed as a solution to sexual and gendered deviancy and that 
eugenics and its logic were able to absorb these categories into its purview and that the 
terms it set are still relevant in the contemporary era where sexual orientation is assumed 
to be a product of genetics (2003). These examples show that eugenics is not limited to 
any one time period or body of knowledge; it is a pattern of thought that emphasizes the 
inherent nature of the qualities it maps onto bodies, and that propels the assumption that 
human progress can be measured through biological means and that ensuring the steady 
progress of humanity means regulating impure populations. 
The third and final key function of eugenic rhetoric is to draw attention away 
from systemic analysis and towards reductive essentialist analysis. Eugenic rhetoric turns 
attention away from social or structural analysis; it insists that social problems can be 
alleviated by managing reproduction and that, ultimately, the political conflicts at any 
given time in a society are mere expressions of a more true and concrete biological 
reality, one that is governed by notions of evolutionary purity and impurity. Ordover 
writes that the desire inherent in eugenic thought to “substantiate and sustain existing 
social hierarchies” motivates the move “to evade analyses of socioeconomically 
generated inequalities” (2003, p. 9).  By creating a logical framework for understanding 
social problems as signifiers of bad biology or genes, eugenic rhetoric forecloses upon 
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any analysis of socially generated inequalities and thus alternate solutions or courses of 
actions that focus on altering social structures and/or extending support to those 
disadvantaged by currently existing structures. In fact, proponents of eugenics often 
arrive at the opposite conclusion and consider any means of social support to be a 
pointless waste of resources at best and a harm to the purity of the nation at worst 
(Roberts, 1998). The reduction of complex social issues and political realities to matters 
of reproduction and genetics robs one of rigorous analysis and saddles the already 
disadvantaged and marginalized with the weight of the nation’s problems. Thinking back 
to Wynter’s work, we can say that eugenic thought posits the existence and reproduction 
of other genres of being as the source of social inequality and inequity and that science 
can solve these complex issues by providing the means to manage the proliferation and 
extermination or favored and disfavored genres, respectively. The regulation (and 
eventual extermination) of improper genres is then thought to secure a future free of 
social problems for the rightfully dominant genre of Man. 
Although eugenics and its rhetoric were more or less “formally” admonished by 
the West after World War II amidst the revelations about the connections between 
eugenics and the holocaust, eugenics and its structuring of the world through the three 
functions I have outlined continued into the latter half of the 20th century through 
sterilization abuse and the reemergence of overtly biologist approaches to social 
inequality and questions of identity (Ordover, 2003; Roberts, 1998). Furthermore, the 
logics that eugenics relies on provided fertile ground for other imaginings of eugenic-like 
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projects that deploy different vocabularies to make similar claims and achieve similar 
goals. 
 
Activating the Majority: Modern Eugenic Analogies 
“The choice we make in 1968 will determine not only the future of America but 
the future of peace and freedom in the world for the last third of the Twentieth Century” 
Richard Nixon direly predicts during his acceptance speech at the Republican National 
Convention in 1968 (1968). In the same speech, Nixon goes on to list many of the 
anxieties of the nation; deaths on “distant battlefields,” mutual hate and “killing each 
other” within the nation, and the “anguish” coming from Americans who are forced to 
“see and hear these things” (1968). The answer to these many problems is to be found in 
“the voice of the great majority of Americans, the forgotten Americans – the non-
shouters; the non-demonstrators” Nixon informs us (1968). He reassures us that these 
Americans “are not racist or sick,” “guilty of the crime that plagues the land,” and that 
they are ultimately “decent people” who work, save, and pay taxes (1968). The rhetorical 
strategy that Nixon deploys here – singling out a supposed “majority” of Americans who 
found themselves forgotten amongst the protests and anguish of the turbulent 1960s – 
would go on to be developed and refined in Nixon’s tenure as president, culminating in 
the “silent majority” strategy that aimed to mobilize voters in favor of Nixon and his 
policies. 
However, the "silent majority" was not just a novel way of imagining a coalition 
for the presidency of Richard Nixon; it was an activation and recoding of an already 
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existing political logic of eugenics. Nixon’s insistence that he must represent a 
wrongfully silent (and thus unrepresented) majority in order to defend it from the 
excesses of a vocal minority effectively capitalized on the notion that minorities harmed 
the majority and the nation. Furthermore, the rhetorical strategy recoded the overly 
biological terms that originally framed the argument in the eugenics movement into 
political terms that appealed to liberal values such as majority-rule. In this section, I will 
briefly review the history of the “silent majority” rhetorical strategy, how it fulfills 
similar functions to the rhetoric of eugenics, and how it reorganizes eugenic arguments 
with new political terminology. 
Nixon’s election to the presidency in 1968 was marked by a lack of enthusiastic 
support for Nixon as a candidate, which was particularly distressing to him as someone 
who was very concerned with image and matters of public relations (King & Anderson, 
1971; Mason, 2004). Nixon’s gradual development of the themes from his acceptance 
speech (“forgotten Americans”) into the concept of a “silent majority” was directed 
specifically at turning a “rhetorical assertion” into a “political formation” (Lowndes, 
2016, pp. 25–26). To accomplish this, Nixon and his team set out to provide the untapped 
“forgotten Americans” with a kind of political image that appeared “legitimate, coherent, 
and significant” (King & Anderson, 1971, p. 245). The development of this image 
through the rhetoric of the “silent majority” was, for Nixon, about maximizing support 
for his policies, both domestically and abroad in Vietnam, which continued to be a 
particularly divisive political issue (King & Anderson, 1971; Mason, 2004). The 
emerging rhetorical strategy that accompanied invocations of the “silent majority” trope 
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was one that emphasized political polarization above all else. On one side was Nixon’s 
“silent majority” and on the other was a coalition of drug users, unproductive protestors, 
and liberals only concerned with issues affecting Black Americans (King & Anderson, 
1971; Lowndes, 2016; Mason, 2004). Nixon’s rhetorical strategy framed social ills as 
emanating from these “external enemies” who were actively and intentionally attempting 
to subvert the American way of life. King and Anderson’s study notes that this strategy 
was particularly effective at directing the attention and displacing the guilt of a troubled 
nation onto these now discernable enemies constructed in opposition to the “silent 
majority” (1971). Nixon and his team specifically mobilized voters against anti-war 
protests on the basis of racial anxieties, such as the perception that African-Americans 
were advancing economically at a faster pace than white Americans, presumably due to 
government intervention (Lowndes, 2016; Mason, 2004). The notions that social 
problems were caused by certain groups of people and that those groups of people are 
advancing at a faster rate due to overrepresentation formed the basis of Nixon’s “silent 
majority” strategy. The “non-shouters” had to now be marked, campaigned for, and 
represented to combat the onslaught of minority groups bringing crimes and drugs to 
middle America and suburbia. 
Many scholars consider Nixon’s crafting and use of the “silent majority” trope as 
a pivotal moment in his presidency and in the general trajectory of the American Right 
overall; Lowndes goes to far as to assert “the modern Republican Party in the US was 
made possible through the concrete realization of the Silent Majority” (2016, p. 26). The 
success of this concept and the rhetoric it relies on and perpetuates should not simply be 
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attributed to Nixon and his team being especially politically savvy. This is not to discount 
the Nixon administration’s role in cementing and perfecting the “silent majority” trope, 
but it would be naïve to speculate that such a trope emerged spontaneously and in a 
theoretical vacuum. Instead, I would like to suggest that the initial and ongoing success of 
such a concept is due to the ways in which it formed a rhetorical analog with the already-
existing rhetorical foundations of eugenics. To put it another way, the “silent majority” 
was so successful as an enduring political strategy because it relied on similar notions and 
acted in similar ways to the rhetoric of eugenics, thus endowing it with a “commonsense” 
familiarity that made it legible to people already immersed in a culture strongly 
influenced by eugenics and the frames of understanding that it relied on. Contextualizing 
the “silent majority” trope in this way also allows us to consider this political rhetoric in 
the larger context of ethnocentric domination that Wynter outlines; the “silent majority” 
merely re-stated the case of Man against non-Man, substituting “Man” with “majority” 
and “non-Man” with “minority.” 
Using the “silent majority” as a political and rhetorical strategy completes the 
three key functions of eugenic rhetoric that I highlighted earlier. First, the silent majority 
maps pure and proper politics onto a particular group (silent majority) that is assumed to 
be in danger of being usurped by an impure minority (protestors, minorities on welfare, 
etc). Furthermore, it is assumed in this rhetorical mapping that the fate of the current 
political society hinges upon the continued leadership and hegemony of the pure class; 
anything else will lead to political, moral, and ethical degradation. What the silent 
majority does is tap into an already existing logic and re-codes it into political terms. It 
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re-wires racial anxiety onto the language of politics. Dominant races and good genes 
become dominant majorities and good politics that is shared by a majority group. The 
implication is that aggrieved minorities are wrongfully siphoning government support 
and attention that outweighs their "rightful" claims to such resources based on their 
minority status. Furthermore, such support undermines the interests of the majority and 
the political field in which they are situated. Thus, the imperative becomes to render the 
minority politically impotent; the focus shifts from overt biological regulation to political 
regulation. However, this does not mean "true" eugenics stopped; it, in fact, continued 
alongside the use of the silent majority trope through the practice of forced sterilization 
and surveillance of mothers on welfare, and both drew on the notion of proper genres of 
the human (Lombardo, 2011). 
Secondly, the use of the silent or disenfranchised majority shows a similar 
elasticity and fungibility to the concept of eugenics. It travels to different political issues, 
philosophies, and parties just like eugenics did at the turn of the century. The concept of 
speaking for a supposedly silenced majority would go on to inspire other movements 
such as Jerry Falwell’s “Moral Majority,” as well as concepts such as “political 
correctness” and “identity politics” that rely on the notion of vengeful minorities 
silencing rightful majorities (Soileau, 1985). The rhetoric of re-focusing on the majority 
would even become part of Democratic Party politics in the 1990s, as the party steered 
away from its image as a “civil rights” party and towards issues explicitly attractive to 
“white working and middle class votes” (Lowndes, 2016, p. 31). Even in contemporary 
politics, a fetishized fascination with the white working-class that emerged from Donald 
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Trump’s election solicit the notion that the election represented a push back from a group 
supposedly forgotten due to an excessive focus on minority issues. Like eugenics, the 
political currency possessed by the “silent majority” is, in part, due to its conceptual 
elasticity and ability to adapt to varying political issues, movements, and moments. 
Thirdly, the silent majority rhetorical strategy draws attention away from the 
systemic nature of social problems and towards issues of “proper” political 
representation. The issue tends to become that minorities have too much political power 
and influence over the political sphere and that this improper allocation of political power 
is to blame for social ills. The problem becomes, for example "too many Black people are 
on welfare" instead of "the labor system is fundamentally flawed." Attention is turned 
toward curtailing or silencing minority groups instead of addressing the systemic issues 
that minorities often critique or fight back against. Critical race scholar Abby Ferber 
places such rhetorical strategies as a part of a larger culture of “oppression blindness,” 
which “operates to defend the culture of privilege against perceived attacks” (2012, p. 
69). Ferber is critical of approaches to anti-racism that do not consider the 
“intersectional” ways in which multiple axes of oppression are systemically minimized 
and ignored. Majoritarian rhetoric is one way in which “oppression blind” rhetoric has 
become perfected; it allows for the minimization of oppression using language that 
sounds democratic and appeals to ingrained political patterns of liberalism. Eugenics 
draws our attention to the biological representation of the dominant genre of human; the 
silent majority draws our attention to the political representation of the dominant genre. 
32 
 
The connections between the rhetoric of the majority and the rhetoric of eugenics 
shows that both bodies of rhetoric fulfill similar functions and seem to rely on 
comparable political logics, particularly in regards to the relationships between majority 
groups and minority groups. However, I want to go further than merely suggesting that 
these rhetorical patterns are simply similar. In order to better understand how these 
discourses and logics resemble and rely on one another in order to be legible, I will now 
turn to a text that explicitly theorizes the two strands as one and thus reveal how they 
intersect with one another. 
 
Robertson’s American Majority 
Wilmot Robertson is a self-described “native Pennsylvanian” whose credentials 
include “long periods of study” at universities, service as “an army office in World War 
II,” and a “varied career in journalism, advertising, and small business,” with “an 
overwhelming concern for the darkening tragedy of his people” (1973, p. 619). Robertson 
runs a small publishing house in Florida that publishes “white racialist books” and a 
magazine called Instauration (Berbrier, 1998, p. 435). In 1976, Robertson published his 
own book titled The Dispossessed Majority, a burgeoning 600-page treatise written in an 
intellectual style with dense footnoting and appendices that outlined Robertson’s ideas 
about the decline of the so-called “American Majority” (Berbrier, 1998). In The 
Dispossessed Majority, Robertson elaborates at length on the nature of race, the human, 
and the Western political system, concluding that the “decline” of the United States that 
he writes in response to is largely attributable to the decline of the “American Majority,” 
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which, according to Robertson, are white Americans of Northern European descent 
(1973). In this section, I will pursue an extended textual analysis of The Dispossessed 
Majority in order to understand how Robertson is theorizing the relationship between 
race, politics, and the majority, and how this theorizing is informed and implicated in the 
rhetorics of eugenics and Nixon’s “silent majority” strategy. 
Robertson’s text begins with a short preface that outline his goals for the book and 
who his book is for:  
 
The most truly disadvantaged are those who are hated for their virtues not their 
vices, who insist on playing the game of life with opponents who have long ago 
abandoned the rules, who stubbornly go on believing that a set of highly 
sophisticated institutions developed by and for a particular people at a particular 
point in time and space is operational for all peoples under all circumstances. 
(1973, p. xi, emphasis mine) 
 
 
In this short opening statement, Robertson alludes to two very central claims in his text: 
that there is a group (later named the “American Majority”) who are “most truly 
disadvantaged” (implying that there are others falsely claiming disadvantage), and that 
the political institutions and values that define the United States have a material 
connection to a specific group of people with shared genetic traits, making it dangerous 
to assume that such institutions are compatible with people who do not share those 
genetic traits. Robertson then goes on to a list a number of American ailments such as 
“the drug and homosexual plagues, AIDS, the taste-killing shock waves of pornography, 
ghetto savagery, the feminist madness, reverse discrimination, the degeneration of the 
military, the torrents of illegal immigrants, the apostasy of the professors and journalists, 
[and] the mindlessness of the students” that may seem eerily similar to anyone familiar 
34 
 
with contemporary American political discourse (1973, p. xii). Nonetheless, Robertson 
assures his readers that these are mere stumbling blocks on the way to a “higher and more 
luminous life form” (1973, p. xii). This indicates that the text is not only concerned with 
making an argument about the current state of things but also with speculating about the 
future and the possibilities of “higher” life forms, invoking a crude evolutionist 
understanding of human development that will be important for many of Robertson’s 
claims throughout the text. 
 The bulk of the book is split up into ten “parts” similar to chapters, all with dense 
footnoting and a few sub-headings, followed by an appendix, bibliography, and index, 
mirroring the layout of an academic text. Parts one through four give a detailed 
explanation of Robertson’s assessment of race, majorities, and minorities, parts five 
though nine detail various “clashes” between the American Majority and what Robertson 
calls “minority racists,” and part ten is dedicate solely to speculating about the future of 
the “American Majority.” Robertson’s writing style is deliberate, sophisticated, and 
methodical, moving between various resources, government documents, and statistical 
tables with the ease of a well-seasoned academic writer. Although it may be tempting to 
dismiss Robertson’s text as the deluded cries of a white supremacist, the organization of 
the text and the style it is written in reflect a certain amount of intellectual labor on the 
part of the author. To put it another way, Robertson’s work reflects a concern for being 
taken seriously as an intellectual text that adheres to the standards of academic decorum. 
Thus, I believe it should be approached as a serious effort to theorize race and politics 
from a white supremacist point of view. We too often dismiss overtly racist viewpoints as 
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the byproducts of unruly anger, ignorance, or general irrationality. Racism can be (and 
often is) rigorously theorized, meticulously structured, and cloaked in rational or logical 
parlance. Furthermore, many of the tropes Robertson invokes, from radical college 
professors to professional minority agitators, are still more than common in contemporary 
political discussions, demonstrating just how familiar and accessible Robertson’s 
arguments are, rather than removed and outlandish. 
 Robertson’s text begins with a short meditation on the nature of race and what it 
means for human society. Robertson writes that while a man may be able give up his 
religion or culture, he “cannot give up the physical side of his race, which… is inexorably 
determined by the laws of genetics” (1973, p. 6). Just how bound up humans are with 
race in Robertson’s rendering is revealed towards the end of the text, where he states that 
“[a]s race has been the controlling factor of the human past, so it will be in the future”  
(1973, p. 556). For Robertson, race seems to be aligned not only with traits and attributes 
but also with trajectories; the biogenetic inheritance called “race” not only determines 
one’s physical features but indeed the fate of humanity itself. Because this rendering of 
race is so dire and places such high stakes upon the concept of race, Robertson is very 
logically led to theorize racism as an equally important force. Robertson defines racism 
as “the overt or covert expression of the concept of race at one or more levels of human 
activity in   politics, art, religion, business, community life, and in the privacy of the 
home” and assigns it great political importance, claiming that it is the “force majeure in 
human achievement and human failure” and that it explains the “rise and fall of 
civilizations” better than factors such as economics, religion, or “even fate” (1973, pp. 7–
36 
 
9) . Robertson is also quick to naturalize racism as “a basic element of human nature” and 
that “practically every nation or society” has passed through “racist cycles” (1973, pp. 8–
10). It is important to note here that Robertson’s understanding of racism is that it does 
not mark an inherently discriminatory or negative act of prejudice; it is simply the 
expression of race as a concept. Where there is race, there is racism; any awareness of 
race is inherently racist in Robertson’s schema. Since race is already everywhere 
genetically, it follows that racism is also already everywhere and is, in fact, an 
undisputable fact of human existence. To deny or decry racism, then, is to deny a 
fundamental scientific reality about humans, as Robertson later claims sociologists and 
anthropologists do at their own peril. This insistence on race as an immutable, genetic 
fact about humans clearly bears affinity with the rhetoric of eugenics, which also maps 
race as an immutable fact that greatly determines productivity and ability. If anything, 
Robertson’s theorizing of race raises the stakes of eugenics in an even more explicit way. 
If racism is merely race consciousness, and racism is a natural part of human society, it is 
only natural that eugenics, a clear and explicit expression of the concept of race, would 
eventually emerge in science. 
 Robertson’s hard and fast understanding of race cements his ever-important 
concept of the American Majority, which Robertson always capitalizes, indicating its 
prominence. For Robertson, the American Majority is not a designation for a group 
within the United States that happens to be a majority of the population but a “discrete 
genetic and cultural continuum” (1973, pp. 70–71). Robertson claims that this group is 
made up of “Nordic, Alpine, Nordic-Alpine and Nordic-Mediterranean elements of the 
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population,” and, at the time the text was written, made up almost seventy percent of all 
Americans (1973, pp. 29–30, 65). It is extremely important to note here that Robertson’s 
use of the word “majority” in his American Majority concept is specifically not 
mathematical in the conventional sense. Other groups cannot become the “American 
Majority” (though some can be partially assimilated) and even if the American Majority 
were overtaken in the population, it would still continue to be the American Majority. 
“Majority” here refers to a claim that is not just about numbers but is also about essence. 
For Robertson, the American Majority is the enabling essence of America; it is a genetic 
group that quite literally carries American democracy with it. Even if minorities become 
a majority they can never be the Majority, because the Majority is the genetic material 
from which America (politics, culture, and all) is expressed. Robertson argues that “it 
should be emphasized that the power and durability of a race do not depend on numbers. 
A healthy morale, a healthy biology, and a consciousness of kind are  more important 
factors than size” (1973, pp. 65–66). The actual, mathematical majority-ness of the 
Majority is irrelevant, in other words. It is the fact that the Majority is genetically 
superior and thus indisputably more likely to produce successful civilizations that makes 
the Majority so important and this is why “consciousness of kind” or racism as Robertson 
defines it is so important. If you believe that race is a natural genetic substance that 
confers the potential or lack thereof for advanced civil society, then to be aware of race is 
to be aware of the means by which society is literally genetically reproduced. Any threat 
to this precious genetic substance is thus a biological and cultural threat to society as we 
know it. 
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 It is fairly easy to ascertain Robertson’s views about those who fall outside of the 
American Majority by proceeding logically from how he has sketched his argument thus 
far. If the American Majority comprises the raw genetic material from which political and 
cultural good flows forth, the minorities in opposition must only bring trouble and strife. 
Robertson splits minorities up into five primary groups: “assimilated minorities,” 
containing people of Irish, Finnish, and Slavic descent, among others, “unassimilable 
white minorities,” containing Southern Italians, Spanish-speaking white minorities, and 
some Mediterranean individuals, “the Jews,” “nonwhite minorities,” containing people of 
Mexican, Cuban, Chinese, Japanese, and Native descent, and “the negroes,” which 
deserve their own chapter for being the “largest and most violent minority” (1973, pp. 
125–236). “Negro racism,” as Robertson calls it, “has now reached the point where it has 
literally grounded the once soaring American Zeitgeist and threatens to mutilate it beyond 
recognition” (1973, p. 217). Robertson goes on to describe a number of tropes common 
to anti-Black rhetoric including armed Black men, a “large criminal caste,” drug abusers, 
welfare recipients, and fatherless families (1973, p. 217). Robertson’s treatment of 
African-Americans as the most debased and most “backwards” of the racial types he 
mentions confirms Sylvia Wynter’s claim about the status of Man, which is cemented by 
its opposition to the negro at the human nadir (2003). In Robertson’s argument, 
Blackness essentially forms the antithesis to the American Majority. It is the least 
assimilable and clearly the most dangerous to the biocultural well-being of the nation, 
threatening to snuff it out completely. It is the natural opposite to the genetic superiority 
of the American Majority and thus opposite in culture, achievement, and overall success 
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at being since, in Robertson’s view, genetics and race explain everything else. The 
connection between race, genetics, and success at life is what makes Robertson’s 
argument so clearly connected to the logic and rhetoric of eugenics, which are 
pathologized forms of life that fell out of the narrow ethnoclass of Man. 
 The next facets of Robertson’s argument are perhaps the most important in his 
text, as it articulates and theorizes what is left subtle and implied in the rhetoric of 
eugenics. Robertson’s utter faith in genetics and race as explanatory factors for social 
phenomena leads him to believe that philosophical or “classic” liberalism and the 
institutions that spring forth from it are cultural and political expressions of a genetic 
reality, one that is not and cannot be shared by other genetic groups. Robertson 
differentiates between a fraudulent “modern liberalism,” which he calls “illiberal” and the 
“party platform of minority racism,” and “classic liberalism,” which he defines as an 
individualist, propertied ideology that was in no way sympathetic to the cause of racial 
equality (1973, pp. 333–338). Robertson specifically allies this “classic liberalism” as the 
more authentic of the two and credits it with “eighteenth-century Whig governments in 
England, [and] the founding of the United States” (1973, p. 334). Robertson claims that 
the political qualities typical of classic liberalism, such as “[a] fondness for personal 
freedom, an independence of spirit, the unusually high status accorded to women, and a 
deep affection for the land,” are genetically inherited by the American Majority from 
ancient Germans (1973, p. 78). This leads Robertson to conclude that “if a special 
biological inheritance had accounted for the progress and prosperity of the Northern 
European states in the Old World, it would have been reasonable to expect that a New 
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World country with an overabundance of the same genetic resources would become an 
even greater nation, perhaps the greatest nation of all” (1973, p. 79). Thus, for Robertson, 
classic liberalism and democracy are the political expression of racial aptitude that, quite 
naturally, cannot occur from groups of individuals who have not “inherited” classic 
liberalism and democratic tendencies. Robertson decries egalitarian Majority members 
who “are trying to transplant a faded, withered ideology, which functioned adequately 
under a special set of historical and genetic conditions, to a different age and to an often 
hostile and alien environment,” noting that doing so has transformed “an intraracial 
struggle for individual rights and liberty into an interracial struggle for power” (in other 
words, what he calls “modern liberalism”) (1973, pp. 111, 139). This explicit suturing of 
race and classic liberalism here makes it clear exactly why racial purity is necessary for 
the reproduction of society; classic liberalism, the philosophical and cultural foundation 
of the West, is a racial trait that must be cultivated through the management of race and 
genetics. To desire a liberal future is to desire a future dominated by the American 
Majority because one cannot occur without the other. True liberalism is a racial quality 
manifesting on the political strata. The willingness of the Majority to share their genetic 
spoils of true liberalism and democracy with those genetically unfamiliar with concepts 
such as self-governance, self-reliance, and individual rights led to liberalism being used 
by minorities “for purposes entirely different from those for which they had been 
intended” (1973, p. 552). 
The concern for Robertson is not just that minorities are growing in number 
(recall that Robertson doesn’t believe the strength or durability of a race is dependent on 
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numbers) but that they are growing in consciousness of their race, or “racism” as 
Robertson defines it, and that their racism is naturally antithetical to liberalism and 
democracy. Furthermore, Robertson’s claim is that minorities have (wrongly) used 
liberalism to nurture their own race consciousness while preventing the Majority from 
doing the same. “Minority participation in politics and all other aspects of American life 
has now increased to where it can be said that the Majority is no longer the racial 
establishment of the United States,” Robertson claims (1973, p. 82). The Majority may 
still be the majority and lead relatively prosperous lives but is politically “circumspect to 
the point of pusillanimity” (Robertson, 1973, p. 83). Unlike minorities, the Majority has 
no scholarship on common racial identity, no watchdog organizations such as the Anti-
Defamation League, and no literary or cultural representations of racial pride (Robertson, 
1973). Most conclusive of the Majority’s enforced silence at the mercy of minority 
racism is the media coverage of the Moon landing, which “was often treated with veiled 
hostility and even described as a deliberate trick to divert attention from the plight and 
needs of the poor and underprivileged” (Robertson, 1973, p. 96). It is key to understand 
here that Robertson does not believe that minority racial groups are unentitled to their 
race consciousness which, for Robertson, is a natural facet of human nature, but that 
minorities have twisted true “classic” liberalism in such a way that they are allowed to be 
race conscious while the American Majority is not (1973). Since race, consciousness of 
race, and the political are all inextricably intertwined for Robertson, a lack of race 
consciousness is a fundamental political lack. Through bloc voting, appeals to the courts, 
and control of culture and the media, minority racism and antiracism (in Robertson’s 
42 
 
view, they are one) have effectively dulled the political reflexes of the Majority, even 
when they hold power through elected office (Robertson, 1973).  
For Robertson, liberalism and democracy cannot deal with these racial clashes 
because they are race-specific and connected to the notion of universal human progress in 
Robertson’s theorizing. Robertson writes that “In its dynamic stages racism can only be 
controlled or suppressed by superior force, a force most effectively provided by an 
opposing or countervailing racism” (1973, p. 226). In other words, the race consciousness 
of the Majority is what reproduces the political, of which liberalism is a part, not the 
other way around. The debilitation of white racism corresponds to the debilitation of 
society which further corresponds to the “profitability” of minority militancy. With no 
“effective preachers or teachers to defend the Majority cause, no contemporary literature 
or theater, no press to speak of, and… no nationwide forum of expression” the rightful 
ascendancy of the Majority was “efficiently blotted out” (Robertson, 1973, p. 554). 
This process of minority growth, the corruption of liberalism into a platform for 
minority racism, and the “blotting out” of the Majority through separating it from its 
rightful ascendancy is what Robertson refers to in his use of “dispossession” in the title of 
the text. Oxford defines dispossession as the act of “[depriving] (someone) of land, 
property, or other possessions,” a sentiment captured quite nicely as Robertson laments 
that “there is hardly a greater form of dispossession than becoming a servant in one's own 
house” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.; 1973, p. 99). This treatment of the American Majority 
as “possessing” something that can be lost and that such a loss would render them 
“servants in their own house” is fascinating in that it renders the genetic/racial/political 
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ascendancy of the Majority as a kind of property, similar to how whiteness is understood 
to be property by Cheryl Harris. Harris argues that the concept of whiteness cannot be 
disentangled from the concept of property and that, in fact, whiteness is a “highly volatile 
and unstable form of property,” that was “the characteristic, the attribute, the property of 
free beings” (1993, pp. 1720–1721). Harris reveals in her work how the ability to possess 
was understood to be unique to whiteness, not a universal attribute, and that exclusion (of 
people from whiteness) made whiteness into a kind of valuable property (1993). 
Robertson’s invocation of the Majority-member being made into a “servant in their own 
house” by dispossession is an acknowledgment that Majority status is a kind of property 
and that the lack of this property means to be outside of whiteness. The lingering fear in 
this statement is that property will not only be seized but then weaponized against its 
original owner through forced servitude. To put it another way, Robertson fears that the 
classic liberal apparatus built by the Majority (the “house” as it were) that relied on the 
exclusion of non-whites will one day be used by the minority to exclude the Majority and 
that the precarious value of whiteness will be lost and deployed to oppress those who 
depended on oppression. This apprehension elucidates the injury that must be done to 
maintain whiteness in that it is a fear that whiteness or the Majority will one day become 
located in the place of injury rather than non-whiteness or the minority.     
The tracing and suturing of the concept of immutable racial qualities to the 
rhetoric of the Majority and political value is what connects Robertson’s claims to those 
of Nixon’s. Robertson makes explicit what Nixon's majority rhetoric leaves silent; that 
the “majority” is to political society as the white race is to the genetic health of the nation 
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in eugenics. It is a distinct and rightfully ascendant and propertied bloc that has a 
legitimate interest in managing the political life of the minority. In eugenics, this 
ascendancy is articulated as biological (minorities threaten our evolution as a species). In 
Nixon’s rhetoric of the Silent Majority, this ascendancy is articulated as sociopolitical 
(minorities threaten our political and cultural representation). What Robertson’s text 
demonstrates is that these two stratum are not discrete and coincidentally analogous 
rhetorical strategies. In order to achieve logical and rhetorical consistency, the biological 
and political must be theorized together, even if that theorization remains largely 
unspoken or implied. Without the concept of immutable group qualities that have a 
material linkage to liberal society, the logic of Nixon’s “Silent Majority” breaks down 
completely. Under the foundational principal of majority-rule in liberalism, any group 
achieving fifty percent plus one unit (a mathematical majority) should theoretically have 
a claim to a majority of political power. What Nixon signifies with the Silent Majority is 
the unmarked assumption that the political and cultural well-being of the nation is 
dependent on a propertied group with identifiable qualities that make them fit to 
determine the political arena, which is constantly threatened by aggressive minorities 
who censor and shame the majority while seizing political power and consciousness for 
illiberal ends. What Robertson’s American Majority and Nixon’s Silent Majority do is 
articulate a political space for otherwise unmarked assumptions of natural sociocultural 
ascendancy and superiority to be marked using language that sounds democratic. What 
sounds like a plea for the forgotten majority is a way of signifying a supposedly forgotten 
superior propertied nature of a discrete group of people. The key difference is that 
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Robertson’s Majority makes explicit the biological nature of the political ascendancy of 
the superior ethnoclass, while Nixon’s majority leaves it unspoken but implied as he and 
others praise the assumed immutable morality of the majority while decrying the lack 
therof in the minorities. To put it another way, the articulation of the “silent majority” 
works to reproduce the assumption of a rightfully ascendant biopolitical bloc with a 
legitimate claim to leadership prior to liberalism and majority-rule while occluding that 
very assumption through the language of liberalism and representation. It is, to put it in 
Robertson’s terms, a method of fostering “race consciousness” without explicitly 
articulating racial claims.   
This is what other scholars of political science have missed by refusing to 
seriously engage with fields of thought such as critical race theory and critical ethnic 
studies; these developments are not new or novel and do not represent an original way of 
thinking about political subjectivity and mobilization, but in fact tap into a much deeply 
ingrained understanding of what the political is and who it should serve. While explicit 
white supremacy and the idea of an organic white people may not be explicitly popular 
when articulated as such, what Robertson's book shows is that the underlying biological 
eugenic logic can very easily translate and fit into language that sounds democratic and 
philosophically liberal. Furthermore, Robertson, Nixon, and proponents of eugenics all 
rhetorically link the reproduction of proper society with a narrowly defined population, 
implying that proper politics is the expression of a particular reality associated with the 
immutable qualities of this population.  
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In this chapter, my analysis has demonstrated that political rhetoric exceeds mere 
persuasion or strategy; the rhetoric of the political actually maps what the political is, 
who can participate in it, and who must be forbidden from participating. Eugenics was a 
way of mapping the political through the language of science. Both Robertson and Nixon 
draw on the mapping put forth by eugenics while also establishing an analog rhetoric of 
the majority that recodes the hard science of eugenics into political terms. This mapping 
of the political as a pure and proper social force against an impure and improper social 
contagion is not confined to the eras I have covered in this chapter. They continue to be 
reproduced in political contexts today and are part of a longer history of domination and 
subjugation by a social system that overdetermines a narrow way of being as the only 
proper way of being. Eugenic metaphors and analogs continue to be produced in modern 
political rhetoric and continue to do the work of foreclosing upon other possibilities for 
thinking about what politics is or could be.
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CHAPTER III 
IDENTITY AND THE POLITICS OF EXCESS 
As time moves on and political environments change, so does political rhetoric. 
The rhetoric of the “silent majority” and all of the connotations carried by that signifier 
slipped away after Nixon’s presidency and other signifiers came to hold the conceptual 
space it occupied. The 1980s gave rise to concepts such as “welfare queen” and “tough 
on crime” that reproduced the core logics of eugenics and the “silent majority” by 
imagining the Majority as victims of violent and parasitic minorities. Similar 
reproductions continued into the 1990s, with the rise of texts such as The Closing of the 
American Mind, Illiberal Education, and Tenured Radicals that imagined common-sense 
American concepts like free speech and freedom of thought to be under attack by waves 
of “political correctness” emanating from college campuses around the United States 
(Bloom, 1988; D’Souza, 1991; Kimball, 2008). The demands of minorities, according to 
critics of “PC culture,” were quickly swelling far beyond reason and threatened American 
education and the future of American politics. As a rhetorical strategy, invoking “political 
correctness” was largely successful, leading the term to stick to political discourse well 
into the 2000s.
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Although the specific terms had shifted, rhetorical tropes like “political 
correctness” and “welfare queen” still reflected an imagining of the political that pitted a 
pure, proper expression of politics and civil society (attached to white and normatively 
gendered bodies) against an impurity (attached to non-white and non-normatively 
gendered bodies) whose very presence signified the collapse of the civil and the political. 
In other words, these concepts told a similar story to the ones told by eugenics and 
majoritarianism; that minorities must be politically managed (genetically and/or 
politically) in order to successfully reproduce civil society in the future for the majority. 
As Sylvia Wynter highlights in her work, these stories are the continued re-stagings and 
progression of a political struggle between the overdetermined colonial genre of Man and 
other genres of the human that follows from the epistemological and ontological 
underpinnings of the Enlightenment (2003). 
Following the previous chapter’s documenting and analysis of this ongoing 
political struggle that profoundly affects the way in which certain political subjects are 
produced and how they interact and function with the political, this chapter will take up 
texts responding to the results of the 2016 presidential election to argue that this political 
story is continuing to be told and, specifically, has undergone a significant revival in 
modern political discourse through a new signifier of “identity politics.” My selection of 
the aftermath of the 2016 election as my site of inquiry in this chapter is supported by the 
resurgence of interest in terms like “political correctness,” “silent majority,” and “identity 
politics” in the weeks following from the date of the election, documented via the Google 
Search Trends online tool which archives interest in specific search terms (See Appendix, 
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Figure 1). The “spike” in interest for these terms occurring within a few weeks of the 
election gives us insight into a crucial political moment that was widely understood to be 
an “upset” that upended long-held political assumptions about notions of “progress” and 
the exceptional nature of the United States as a nation and population. In the weeks 
following the election, these assumptions were hastily re-written and re-coded in order to 
make sense of the election results. The surge in interest of these discrete terms reflects 
not only their similarity and utility for meaning-making in the wake of complex political 
phenomena, but also their work in connecting the political moment of Donald Trump’s 
election to the supposed rise in political work that explicitly grapples with questions of 
racial and gendered identity. This supposed connection supports a narrative according to 
which Trump’s election was the result of the left’s defiance of the “silent majority” 
through an excessive focus on “political correctness” and “identity politics” which is a 
narrative that conveniently allows the left to displace and map its political anxiety onto 
minoritized groups, similar to the displacement of political anxiety onto minorities 
through genetics and race science in the eugenic era. 
The specific texts I will engage with in this chapter to document these repeating 
rhetorical patterns are authored by Mark Lilla, a professor of humanities at Columbia 
University who specializes in “intellectual history, with a particular focus on Western 
political and religious thought”  (Columbia University, 2017). Lilla became associated 
with left-leaning critiques of the concept of “identity politics” (which Lilla alternates with 
“identity liberalism”) after publishing an op-ed in the New York Times titled “The End of 
Identity Liberalism” where he posited that the Democratic Party lost the 2016 election 
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because it focused on issues related to “identity” that alienated white working-class 
voters and drove them to vote for Trump and others in the Republican Party (2016). 
Lilla’s op-ed was widely circulated after its publication to much celebration from some 
and much critique from others, eventually receiving a follow-up extension in the form of 
a short book called The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics. Lilla became 
something of a minor political celebrity during this time, giving interviews to 
publications like Vox, The Guardian, and the New Yorker. Lilla’s seeming authority and 
wide circulation in contemporary political discourse is why I have selected three of his 
texts – his original op-ed, his book, and an interview on the book given to Vox – as my 
primary sources for this chapter. While Lilla’s remarks and opinions on “identity 
politics” cannot be regarded as comprehensive, I believe their wide circulation and 
overall popularity attest to their resonance with current understandings of the interactions 
between identity, minority groups, and American politics. 
As with Robertson’s text as discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis, there 
has a been a relative lack of scholarly engagement with Lilla’s arguments1. Although 
there have been several critiques of Lilla from mainstream publications, they have largely 
focused on trying to refute Lilla on his own terms, often arguing that “identity politics” is 
simply a “good thing” in contrast to Lilla’s assessment. My intention in this chapter is not 
to prove Lilla wrong about “identity politics” or argue that what he names as “identity 
politics” is desirable, which would accept the terms and framings that Lilla has put forth. 
                                                          
1 As of the date of this writing, Google Scholar only reports two English-language peer-reviewed articles 
that cite Lilla’s book, neither of which engage in a sustained analysis of Lilla’s arguments (see (Davidson, 
2017; Francescato, 2018). 
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Instead, it will be to understand how “identity politics” rhetorically functions as a concept 
and trope in Lilla’s text and how he uses it to theorize about what constitutes true politics. 
My reading of Lilla is intended to be attentive to the rhetorical moves he makes, what 
evidence he cites to construct his argument, and what his argument necessarily excludes 
in order to achieve coherency and a logical flow. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate that 
the rhetorical and logical moves Lilla makes are analogous to the moves made in eugenic 
and majoritarian thought that define a pure and proper politics against an aberrant 
difference that is perceived as a threat to the possibility of politics. 
Before moving on into a textual analysis, it is important to note a couple of details 
about the context of Lilla’s texts and how those contexts bear on my analysis. First, it is 
important to understand that Lilla is writing not only as a political and intellectual 
historian in these texts, but also as a political strategist. In his interview with Vox, Lilla 
explicitly articulates that he is talking about “trying to seize power in this country” 
through winning elections and enacting progressive policies (2017). Lilla’s normative 
critique is, essentially, that focusing on issues related to “identity” costs the Democratic 
Party election victories. While some may object to treating a work of political strategy as 
an object for close theoretical analysis, scholars like Chandan Reddy have highlighted the 
perils of citing strategy or pragmatics as the rationale for not pursuing an extended 
analysis of political texts (2011, pp. 5–6). Choosing not to read Lilla’s works as acts of 
political theorizing carries the high stakes of occluding how hierarchical political thought 
comes to be reproduced in the name of political strategy. 
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Secondly, I find it important to note that Lilla is addressing a predominantly 
liberal and left-leaning or at least left-sympathetic audience in these texts, as evidenced 
by his continuously stated support of the Democratic Party, citations to well-known 
figures of progressive politics like Franklin Roosevelt, and allusions to the labor 
movement in the United States (2017) . Thus, it is important that we consider his rhetoric 
as uniquely framed and constructed in a way to maximize persuasive appeal to those on 
the left. As such, my analysis in this chapter will explicitly consider the similarities of 
Lilla’s rhetoric to the rhetoric of eugenics while also highlighting the dissimilar ways in 
which the rhetoric is framed and coded. That is to say, my intention in this chapter is not 
to prove that Lilla is explicitly or directly advocating for eugenics and/or genocide, but 
that Lilla’ rhetorical and argumentative patterns produce similar rhetorical effects in the 
ways in which they render non-white, non-straight, and non-cisgender bodies and their 
utterances as antithetical to politics itself and thus signify political absence. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, a key feature of eugenic-like thought is its elasticity and ability to 
conform to different political contexts. Lilla, in being strategic and writing for a left-
leaning audience, inscribes his argument in a frame and with terms that appear on the 
surface to be radically different than Robertson’s or Nixon’s arguments, but that produce 
a similar mapping of the political, albeit framed in a different light.  
 
Mark Lilla and Identity Politics 
In his assessment of the current state of the American left, Lilla paints a fairly 
grim picture of the current and forthcoming generation of political actors and thinkers. 
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Lilla opens his op-ed for the New York Times by lamenting that liberalism in the United 
States has “slipped into a kind of moral panic about racial, gender and sexual identity” 
that has effectively left liberals incapable of governing. According to Lilla, the past few 
decades have featured an American left that has consistently built up an “omnipresent 
rhetoric of identity” that middle- to lower-class white Americans resent (2016). For Lilla, 
the current state of the left is simply not possible of producing long-term social or 
institutional change. 
There are two key features to Lilla’s understanding of identity and its bearing on 
politics that I find important to highlight. The first is that the intersection of identity and 
politics is a recent development in American politics that can be traced to the rise of the 
individualistic politics associated with Ronald Reagan. In his book, Lilla claims that, 
prior to the 1980s, the United States was dominated by the “Roosevelt Dispensation,” 
which Lilla links to a “collective enterprise” of citizens who were devoted to “solidarity, 
opportunity, and public duty” (2017, p. 8). This political dispensation would later come 
to be usurped in the 1980s by the “Reagan Dispensation” which was attached to an 
individualist imaginary devoted to “self-reliance” and “minimal government” (2017, p. 
8). In carving the last century of American politics up into two broad conceptual sections, 
Lilla is able to assert that the focus on identity on the political left is a novel development 
that is directly connected to the rise of the “Reagan Dispensation,” boldly declaring that 
“identity is Reaganism for lefties” (2017, p. 95).  
Although a politics based around identity and group-consciousness may seem odd 
to trace to Reaganism and individualism, Lilla is not deterred from doing so. For Lilla, 
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the rampant individualism associated with the American right in the 1980s is directly 
related to the rise of “identity politics,” which Lilla considers to be a mode of self-
production and a kind of narcissistic longing to make the world identical to the self 
(2017). According to Lilla, “identity politics” encourages people (especially young 
people) to “[engage] with the world and particularly politics for the limited aim of 
understanding and affirming what one already is” (2017, p. 84). In short, identity is, in 
Lilla’s rendering, a pre-existing set of qualities that one possesses that is only tangentially 
related to the political. Although Lilla admits several times throughout the text that race 
and gender have certainly been political issues in the past, they are only objects of 
political interest and are not necessarily bound up or intrinsically connected with politics 
(2017). Lilla thus considers a preponderance of fixation on such arbitrary traits or 
qualities to be pointedly non-political, rhetorically reducing identity to a set of signifiers 
that are used exclusively in the description and development of a fundamentally apolitical 
self (2017). This move on Lilla’s part to cleave identity from the larger political world is 
extremely important for his overall project of reducing and downplaying the importance 
of identity in American (and especially American leftist) politics by allowing Lilla to 
collapse identity from a complex sociopolitical phenomenon to a mere individualistic set 
of traits.  
 In addition to his assertion that “identity politics” is primarily an individualistic 
and narcissistic exercise, the other key facet of Lilla’s reading of “identity politics” is that 
issues directly related to identity that take the form of concerns over language or culture 
are figured as excessive, exotic, and deliberately petty in the face of “real” political issues 
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such as those related to class or economics. Lilla asserts that the rise of “identity 
consciousness” encourages an “obsessive fascination with the margins of society” that 
are remote to the concerns of real politics (2017, p. 83). Lilla provides “the supposed 
moral urgency of giving college students the right to choose the designated gender 
pronouns to be used when addressing them” and “the fate of transgender people in 
Egypt” as examples of the absurd and excessive focuses of identity politics (2016). Lilla 
also cites specialized terms such as “intersectionality, performativity, [and] 
transgressivity” as evidence of the exotic nature of identity (2017, pp. 86–87). Likewise, 
Lilla aligns the supposed excesses of identity with the excesses of evangelical religious 
thought: 
 
[Identity politics] is mesmerized by symbols: achieving superficial diversity in 
organizations, retelling history to focus on marginal and often minuscule groups, 
concocting inoffensive euphemisms to describe social reality, protecting young 
ears and eyes already accustomed to slasher films from any disturbing encounter 
with alternative viewpoints. Identity liberalism has ceased being a political project 
and has morphed into an evangelical one. (2017, p. 14, emphasis mine) 
 
 
“Symbols,” “superficial,” “marginal,” and “miniscule” are all terms that evoke a sense of 
excessiveness and sense of remoteness from a rational reality. Lilla develops this analogy 
further in his text when he suggests that identity politics swaps real political arguments 
with “taboo” that is deployed to “[parse] every conversation for immodest locutions and 
[rap] the knuckles of those who inadvertently use them,” invoking a “buttoned-up 
Protestant schoolmarm” (2017, p. 91). Lilla’s mocking comparison of the politics of 
identity with the excessive discipline of evangelical religion’s marks identity politics as 
simultaneously excessive, petty, without reason, and even violent. Lilla’s comparison 
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here recalls the kind of othering that has occurred overall several centuries in western 
travel literature, which portrays non-European others encountered during travel as 
“[amenable] to domination,” as scholars like Mary Louis Pratt have noted in their work 
(1985, p. 120). In staking his claim in a kind of psychological deficiency of those who do 
“identity politics,” Lilla reproduces racial metaphors that see racialized Others as without 
reason and sympathetic to irrational discourses of domination, which Lilla invokes here 
with the image of the “Protestant schoolman.” In asserting that “identity politics” is both 
individualistic and excessive, Lilla maps “identity politics” outside of the realm of the 
political, dubbing it “pseudo-political” or even “subpolitical” (2017, p. 57). 
 Lilla’s theorizing and carving out of “identity politics” as outside the limits of 
proper politics relies on several key omissions and outright errors that obscure the long 
history of “identity” as it relates to politics (even if it was not named explicitly as such). 
For example, Lilla discusses (and dismisses) the Combahee River Collective Statement in 
a brief and flippant manner, citing only one quote from the Statement before entering into 
a conversation of the decline of Marxism and the rise of other critical theories in the 
university (2017, p. 83). This scant engagement with the Statement is one of the ways in 
which Lilla ignores the long history of women of color organizing that highlights the 
ways in which “identity” has consistently been a formative condition of politics and the 
distribution of life chances in the United States. Patricia Hill-Collins writes that Black 
feminist critical theory “reflect[s] women’s efforts to come to terms with lived 
experiences within intersecting oppressions of race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, 
nation, and religion… the need for such thought arises because African-American women 
57 
 
as a group remain oppressed within a U.S. context characterized by injustice” (2009, p. 
9). Collins specifically remarks that these social theories “do not arise from the rarefied 
atmosphere of their imaginations” (2009, p. 9). In other words, Black feminist theory 
exists as a mode of understanding and mobilizing collective experiences of injustice in a 
particular political context. Lilla does briefly mention the formative conditions of identity 
politics, but refuses to elaborate on them, consigning them to the past and sketching 
identity politics as something akin to a horoscope or personality analysis, something that 
exists for the sake of a self somewhere that wants to know more about itself.  
Furthermore, the Combahee River Collective Statement actually speaks to the 
interaction between personal experiences, the political, and the potential for change. The 
Statement reads that “as Black women we see Black feminism as the logical political 
movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color 
face” (Combahee River Collective, 1977). In other words, the Statement conceives of the 
Collective’s project as one that is a response to the many oppressions faced by women of 
color, not one that only fulfills a personal desire to know more about oneself. The 
Collective does declare that Black feminism does indeed emerge from personal 
experiences and feelings, but they immediately connect that to the gaining of a political 
conscience which is directed at the outside world and outside forces (1977). Furthermore, 
the Statement explains that “racism …does not allow most Black women, to look more 
deeply into our own experiences and, from that sharing and growing consciousness, to 
build a politics that will change our lives and inevitably end our oppression” (Combahee 
River Collective, 1977). This clear connection between the cultivating and analysis of 
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personal experience in the context of politics building establishes that personal 
exploration is not, as Lilla writes, merely an exercise in vanity that is meant to disconnect 
one from the larger world. In fact, it is the exact opposite; to understand personal 
experiences and build a politics from them to engage the outside world. The Statement’s 
own theorizing and sketching of the political considers personal experiences to be 
paramount to developing a politics; however, it does not, as Lilla argues, create a vision 
of politics that is solely for a rarefied individual that is any way comparable to the image 
of the “rugged individual” that forms the basis of a Reaganist political imaginary. 
 Lilla’s treatment of the Statement and the larger increase in visibility to political 
movements that explicitly invoke “identity” as their formative basis as a new trend that 
can be traced to the latter half of the twentieth century also omits a significant amount of 
sociohistorical context and intellectual history. For example, Lilla, in contrasting 
contemporary social movements to historical ones, highlights the developments of a 
“scholastic vocabulary” in fields like gender studies, containing words like “fluidity, 
hybridity, intersectionality, performativity, transgressivity, and more” (2017, pp. 86–87). 
The highlighting of “intersectionality” and the focus on specificity as opposed to 
generalization in contemporary feminist discourse and the presentation of these qualities 
as novel and as a corruption of a more authentic social movement is interesting, 
particularly given recent scholarship on the intellectual history of “intersectionality” by 
scholars like Ange-Marie Hancock. Hancock demonstrates through a rigorous 
engagement with numerous primary sources that the formal conceptualization of 
“intersectionality” was preceded by decades of women-of-color anti-violence activism 
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that effectively practiced core tenets of intersectionality, such as specificity and attention 
to intersecting categories of oppression, even before the word “intersectionality” was 
coined (2016).  
Lilla’s analysis of identity politics as isolating and naturally aversive to the 
concept of a political “we” is also misguided. Despite Lilla’s claims that a politics rooted 
in identity is fundamentally incompatible with coalition politics, Black feminists have 
engaged with and deployed the concept of coalitions at length in their work. Barbara 
Smith, one of the members of the Combahee River Collective that helped author the 
Statement, remarked that “we didn’t mean that if you’re not the same as us, you’re 
nothing. We were not saying that we didn’t care about anybody who wasn’t exactly like 
us…we worked in coalitions with other people too. We certainly showed up for causes 
that might not be the expected ones for people who had the identities that we had” 
(Taylor et al., 2017, pp. 847–856). The notion that Lilla pushes that those working 
explicitly with identity cannot or will not work with others of different identities is 
clearly not what Smith had when working within the Collective. Smith further remarked 
that refusing to work across lines of difference would be “really, really bad politics” and 
that such a politics could not be conducive to the survival of Black women (Taylor et al., 
2017, p. 857). Given Smith’s comments on the nature of identity politics as it was 
conceived by the Collective, it is clear that the politics theorized by the Statement is not 
one that is isolationist or separatist; in fact, the Statement specifically rejects separatist 
visions of politics, stating that they do not support fractionalization (Combahee River 
Collective, 1977). Coalition, as it turns out, is a key facet of the politics that the 
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Statement proposes, contrary to Lilla’s claims. Other researchers such as Brian Norman 
have also noted the Statement’s wide circulation outside of Black feminist groups, which 
also pushes back on the notion that identity-based scholarship or politics is only relevant 
or able to travel amongst those who share particular identities (2007). In fact, Norman 
claims that the “we” present in the Statement is both “specific to the space and place of 
initial articulation” and “provisional and temporary” in such a way that the manifesto 
anticipates the destruction of subject identities (2007, p. 122). Put another way, the 
Statement acknowledges both the importance of recognizing and respecting the identity 
of the authors while also anticipating and desiring the destruction of oppressive systems 
that construct those identities. 
Another key area of historical inaccuracy comes from Lilla’s association with 
“past” social movements as proper and in-line with the values of citizenship while 
considering modern social movements to have strayed from this ideal to an improper 
focus on identity. This history is shockingly backwards on several accounts, ignoring the 
very radical roots of the second-wave feminist movements and the groups like the Black 
Panthers that existed alongside the Civil Rights movements and within a larger history of 
Black radical thought. Lilla’s analysis here is especially inaccurate in the case of LGBT 
organizing, which, as scholars like Dean Spade have pointed out, actually began as 
radical movements that were then later appropriated and subsumed into nonprofit 
structures in the 1980s, thus becoming less “radical” and more attached to normative 
solutions to identity problems, exactly the opposite of what Lilla seems to suggest (2011). 
Lilla’s disregard of these historical facts and his general lack of engagement with the 
61 
 
Statement, concepts like intersectionality, and the history of identity-based social 
movements could be characterized simply as poor, sloppy, or incomplete research, 
perhaps partially justified by the form of the text and its orientation towards a general, 
rather than academic audience. Doing so, however, ignores the very political implications 
of Lilla’s omissions, which participate in exactly what Hancock highlights in her work, 
which is the erasure of Black women and other women-of-color from intellectual history 
and, furthermore, from the “political” itself. 
 
Citizenship as the Limit of Proper Politics 
The characterization of “identity politics” as based in falseness due to its 
excessiveness, petty nature, and reification of the Reagan individual in Lilla’s work 
provides the constitutive contrast for the “proper” vision of politics that he advocates for 
in his project. The more proper and “true” politics that Lilla proposes in his text is 
defined by an intertwining set of priorities, which he defines as “the priority of 
institutional over movement politics; the priority of democratic persuasion over aimless 
self-expression; and the priority of citizenship over group or personal identity” (2017, p. 
104). Similar to the previous section, I will take up these three “priorities” as rhetorical 
sites that are, in fact, producing a vision of proper politics, even as they are steeped in 
strategic language that figures them as “priorities” rather than theory. As previously 
mentioned, while Lilla is naming his texts and arguments as strategic, it is important to 
consider these arguments as performing a particular type of theorizing about politics, 
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given Lilla’s background in intellectual and political history as well as the text’s wide 
circulation. 
The “priority of citizenship over group or personal identity” is where I will begin, 
given that “citizenship” is the base image upon which Lilla builds his argument and 
which logically leads to the other two “priorities” Lilla mentions (2017, p. 104). Lilla’s 
critique of “identity politics” and “identity liberalism” continually rely on appealing to 
notions such as “commonality,” “shared destiny,” “common good,” and a “universally 
democratic we” that have supposedly been undermined by an aggressive and narcissistic 
focus on identity, which have shifted the focus of politics from “we” to “me” (2016, 
2017, pp. 99, 137). The excessive and unruly rhetoric of identity is, according to Lilla, a 
“depoliticizing force” that effectively prevents a “political vision” of the future of the 
nation from emerging (2017, pp. 103, 137, emphasis mine). Lilla’s figuring of identity 
here as a force that literally possesses the power to “depoliticize” (in other words, 
unmake the political) and prevent the political from emerging is very indicative of how 
Lilla is imagining identity and its relationship to the political. The emphasis here on what 
identity prevents, interrupts, or unmakes figures identity as a sort of artificial and 
secondary wedge that disrupts a primary and natural emergence of the political through 
an identification with the state and the commons of the nation (two concepts which, as I 
will later discuss, Lilla continually conflates).  
Lilla mobilizes an even more violent metaphor when discussing the effects of 
identity on politics in his interview with Vox: “It works for them [Republicans]. It doesn't 
work for us. It's that simple. It's killing us… It's the first thing we think of. It's our 
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mentality now, to immediately think about how different groups are affected, about our 
social differences… We don't have a sense of a national destiny and a national project 
because we can't stop talking about our differences [emphasis mine]” (2017). The 
figuring here of identity as something so excessive that it poses a mortal threat to the left 
and to the left’s vision of the political resonates uneasily with the rhetoric of eugenics, as 
discussed in the last chapter. Of course, Lilla is speaking metaphorically here, but the slip 
from literal death to political death is not without significance. The coincidence that 
Lilla’s metaphor targets the same figures (non-white, non-straight, and non-cisgender) 
that were often the object of eugenic thought and practice, and that Lilla’s framework of 
thinking about the political performs a very similar rhetorical mapping of non-normative 
bodies onto the specter of political ruin as does eugenics (which maps bodies onto genetic 
ruin), cannot be ignored. Lilla’s argument is not new nor does it respond to a novel set of 
circumstances that emerged only recently. 
If, in Lilla’s text, we can read “identity” as the subjugated, excessive, and 
irrational mode of being, then the figure of the “citizen” is Lilla’s marker for the proper 
political genre of Man. The concepts of “citizenship” is, for Lilla, the only proper 
foundation of the political because it is the sole identification that can allow a political 
commons to emerge. Lilla writes that “we must re-learn how to speak to citizens as 
citizens and to frame our appeals – including ones to benefit particular groups – in terms 
of principals that everyone can affirm” (2017, p. 15, emphasis in original). The focus on 
re-learning “how to speak” and the necessity for shooting any claim about particular 
groups through a language of citizenship-as-commonality reflects Lilla’s commitment to 
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a vision of the political that figures “citizenship” as the original political identification in 
the sense that it is literally required to engage and produce politics. When citizenship 
isn’t present, Lilla claims that “there is a natural tendency for subpolitical attachments to 
become paramount in people’s mind” (2017, p. 131). The “subpolitical” as a marker of 
lack in contrast to the “citizen” as a marker of sensibility and reason analogs well with 
Wynter’s terms, with citizen assuming the hierarchical supremacy of Man, while other 
political identifications become subsumed as subpolitical, literally beneath (in terms of 
worth) the proper political genre. 
The contrasting of citizen as proper and reasonable to identity and difference as 
improper and irrational (by virtue of its excessive and petty nature) is further 
demonstrated in Lilla’s text by the supposed ability of citizenship to effectively manage 
and adapt to difference. Lilla asserts that the concept of citizenship is not necessarily 
exclusionary, but can “[absorb] ethnic attachment rather than exclude it” (2017, p. 64). 
Lilla goes on to highlight the African-American civil rights movement as an example of 
citizenship’s egalitarian force, writing that “the leaders of the civil rights movement 
chose to take the concept of universal, equal citizenship more seriously than white 
America ever had. Not to idealize or deny difference – which was evident to the naked 
eye – but to render it politically impotent” (2017, pp. 65–66).  Once again, Lilla paints 
the civil rights movement with a broad brush, but his understanding of citizenship is as 
that which can render difference “politically impotent” as opposed to an idealization or 
denial of difference. Lilla’s statement, when read together with his previous positions of 
identity and difference as “subpolitical” reinforces citizenship as a rational, common 
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sense, and proper foundation for the political. If difference is, as Lilla states, “evident to 
the naked eye” and thus always already present as a simple optical phenomenon, then 
politically identifying with it most likely does seem irrational and excessive in the “eyes” 
of citizenship, which transcend mere optic difference and achieve a universal equality 
that is otherwise made impossible by political identification with differences. Lilla posits 
citizenship, that which “we all shared but which was nothing to do with our identities” as 
the “only way out” of the political conundrum of identity (2017, p. 120). This logic 
renders citizenship as the most rational, most egalitarian, and most advanced mode of 
thinking about the political at the expense of rendering political identifications with 
difference as merely becoming obsessed with that which is “evident to the naked eye.”  
Lilla’s use of “citizenship” as the basis for all political identification creates other 
rhetorical issues in addition to the ones already mentioned, although Lilla’s investment in 
the concept apparently supersedes any need to engage with them substantively. For one, 
the image of the citizen relies on the image of the noncitizen in order to gain meaning or 
coherency; if some people are citizens (in Lilla’s terms, identified with the state), then 
there must be others who aren’t citizens and who aren’t identified with the state (2017). 
Given the recent swell of explicit nativist rhetoric in the United States, one may come to 
the conclusion that the image of the citizen may not be appropriate or resonate for 
individuals who are legally excluded from formal citizenship. Lilla, despite deploying the 
example of immigration to demonstrate the supposed elasticity of citizenship as a 
concept, completely sidesteps any substantive engagement with the potential for 
citizenship to produce a political fracturing effect rather than a unifying one. To the 
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contrary, Lilla points to the idea that citizenship may be an alien concept as a sign of 
political debasement: 
It is a sign of how polluted our political discourse has become that any mention of 
the term citizen leads people to think of the hypocritical and racist demagoguery 
that passes for our “debate” on immigration and refugees today. I will not be 
discussing such matters here, and what I have to say about citizenship implies 
nothing about who should be granted citizenship or how noncitizens should be 
treated. (2017, p. 15)  
 
For Lilla, the taking up of citizenship as a racist trope is simply de facto improper and, in  
fact, a sign of the “pollution” of political discourse that does not warrant serious 
engagement. Lilla’s bold declaration that his text cannot imply anything about citizenship 
in legal terms and thus simply cannot be a fracturing force demonstrates his investment in 
the concept as the basis for the political. 
 The importance of citizenship, the marker of a proper political “we” upon which 
the political rests, leads to the next priority that Lilla describes, which is the “democratic 
persuasion over aimless self-expression” (2017, p. 104). For Lilla, because “citizenship” 
and commonality are the privileged mode of political interaction, the importance of 
persuasion (which produces sameness) as opposed to expression (which produces 
difference) seems logical. According to Lilla, public sentiment is the “basic law of 
democratic politics” and that means that true political work must prioritize the viewpoints 
of the “vast majority” of Americans (2016, 2017, pp. 5–6). Although Lilla explicitly 
states that he is not invoking a “homogenous silent majority,” his repeated emphasis on 
the “public” as the proper object of politics alongside other statements complicates his 
desire to distance himself from the Nixonian rhetoric of the “silent majority” (2017, p. 
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111). Lilla points to the supposed abandonment of the legislative branch (a representative 
branch) for the Supreme Court (a non-representative entity) perpetuated by left-leaning 
social movements as evidence of liberals disdain for “finding out where people stand, 
trying to persuade them, and building a social consensus” with “fellow citizens with 
different views” (2017, pp. 113–114). Lilla also admonishes different social movements 
for interfering with the political process of persuasion and representation, arguing that 
movements deploy rhetoric that alienates citizens from one another and leads to the 
“subpolitical” attachments of identity. For example, he states that “I’m here, I’m queer 
will never provoke more than a pat on the head or a roll of the eyes” and that Black Lives 
Matter is a “textbook example” of an improper non-persuasion politics, writing that the 
movement’s indictment of society, law enforcement, and its “Mau-Mau” tactics 
effectively played into the hands of the Republican party and can thus be held partly 
accountable for its ascent to power (2017, pp. 117–118, 129). The prospect of alienating 
that “vast majority” of citizens is dire enough for Lilla to state in his interview with Vox 
that “we have to emphasize certain things and not emphasize other things… we try to 
remain silent on things that will be too contentious” and that we must “stop thinking and 
talking about ourselves, and sacrifice some of our sacred cows” (2017). In these 
statements, Lilla once again invokes the excessivity of identity while also advocating for 
the management of political difference in such a way that it does not interfere with the 
successful reproduction of the political commons that the “citizen” underlies. Lilla sets 
up his argument in such a way that the sacrifice of some “sacred cows” for the sake of the 
political seems perfectly legitimate and logical. Persuasion and the production of some 
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level of sameness and consensus among political participants is, for Lilla, the marker of a 
proper politics as opposed to the improperness of identity, which recklessly creates 
artificial and arbitrary difference that threatens the political commons and, ultimately, the 
representative function of the state. 
 The centrality and priority of government reform over social movements is Lilla’s 
final priority and it forms the last node in Lilla’s understanding of proper politics. The 
citizen is the basis that ensures a political commons, persuasion is the only mode of 
political engagement that successfully reproduces the commons, and government reform 
is (and always has been) the “main focal point of American democratic politics” (2017, p. 
106). Lilla admits that minorities need more attention, but that the only way to 
“meaningfully defend them” is to win elections at every level of government (2017). The 
emphasis on winning elections leads back to the importance of persuading that “vast 
majority” which establishes the need for a political commons rooted in a common 
citizenship and the management of sectarian differences. The three priorities that Lilla 
sets up as a normative prescription for what the political ought to be establish a system of 
individuals in consensus on their mutual identification with the state (citizenship) whose 
aim is always persuasion (the production of sameness and the closure of difference) for 
the purpose of being properly represented at the level of government as to produce policy 
reforms. This figure of the government as the fulcrum and logical endpoint of the 
political justifies the imperative to produce a political commons that is premised on 
citizenship and persuasion as opposed to other identities and expression. Although Lilla’s 
arguments leave quite a bit out, as previously discussed, the framework that he proposes 
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does in fact produce a coherent image of an ideal political sphere that is based in 
consensus and commonality and thus in which legitimate disagreements and differences 
of opinion can be properly worked out. 
 What is significant and compelling about Lilla’s text is not only that it crafts a 
specific model of politics that Lilla advocates for, which is fairly common in mainstream 
political discourse, but that it claims to map an ideal universal vision of the political 
through the image of the citizen while simultaneously and implicitly advocating for the 
management and, in fact, elimination of certain political modes of engagement. What 
Lilla names as “identity politics” cannot just be a mere difference of opinion that can be 
subsumed within a pluralistic political field. It is, as I have already highlighted, an 
inherently depoliticizing, subpolitical force that is “killing” the left. Individuals who 
participate in “identity politics,” who Lilla generally imagines to be young women, 
college students, Black women, and transgender individuals who actively articulate a 
politics based around their identity, literally come to signify the absence of the political. 
There is no possibility of politically engaging with (for example, by persuasion) identity 
politics because it is inherently marked as a lack of the political. The political model of 
the “citizen” which claims to be universal cannot read identity politics as political 
because it is defined in advance as always already against the politics of identity. Non-
citizen identities can only ever be excessive, petty, and irrational in comparison to the 
rationality of the image of the citizen, which ensures the most productive political sphere 
by excluding those who complicate the function of the state to properly represent and 
mediate between differences in interest between citizens. Modes of politics that do not 
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center a common citizenship, persuasion, and government reform cannot be truly political 
for Lilla because the presence of such modes is read as an absence of politics (pseudo-
politics, as Lilla names it) and is thus a threat to the future of the political. That is to say, 
for Lilla, the future of the political (for the left and for the nation) is contingent upon the 
exclusion of what he names as “identity politics” from politics, hence the subtitle of his 
book “After Identity Politics.” 
 If one considers Lilla’s text to only be a work of political strategy, then it is easy 
to dismiss the dire images and narratives Lilla creates as a strategic way to address and 
shore up a perceived political weakness for the Democratic Party in the United States. 
However, even at this lowered bar of scrutiny, there are issues with Lilla’s argument. As 
Samuel Moyn points out in his review of Lilla’s book for the Boston Review, Lilla 
rightfully points to the “structural realities” in his historical analysis as important for 
understanding political situations, but then ignores a great bulk of those realities by 
choosing to target the “existential neediness” of identity politics and college campuses 
rather than the adoption of libertarian economic philosophy and the rise of neoliberalism 
and neoconservatism that have largely served as the catalysts for more radical 
contemporary social movements (2018). Moyn also smartly asks “Did Lilla come to bury 
identity politics – or simply raise it to the level of the country?” noting that Lilla indicts 
the symbolic politics of identity only to immediately offer the symbolic, non-specific 
image of the citizen as the primary mode of political identity (2018). In short, Lilla does 
not actually advocate for the end of “identity politics” but instead advocates for an 
identity politics that is particularly invested in the identity of the citizen. 
71 
 
 Again, to read Lilla’s project as purely a strategic one could easily lead one to 
assume that Lilla’s strategy is simply a poor one that misses a lot of historical context and 
locates a rather inappropriate object of critique given his stated political goals. This type 
of reading, however, misses the point of why Lilla would choose to frame his argument 
in such a way and what exactly this argument offers and authorizes that a critique of 
neoliberal economics, as suggested by Moyn, would not. By framing the political 
struggle as one between a rational and proper politics that adheres to the liberal traditions 
of citizenship, persuasion, and government reform to an irrational pseudo-politics that 
prioritizes arbitrary group differences over commonality, Lilla is able to argue for the 
management of certain types of political activity. Although he frames it as strategy and as 
specifically for the political left, his critique and overall project suggests that in order to 
successfully produce a liberal and civilized future, political modes that emphasize certain 
expressions of identity must be curtailed and eventually expelled from the political 
imaginary altogether. 
 What is so remarkable about Lilla’s project is not just that he makes an argument 
for the exclusion of certain kinds of politics in the name of politics, but that he frames his 
appeal to the left as one that is essentially targeting the right. I do not find it puzzling that 
Lilla traces what he names as “identity politics” to the rise of Ronald Reagan and makes 
comparisons of social movements like Black Lives Matter to evangelical conservatives; 
doing so allows him to conflate what he wishes to manage (“identity politics”) with 
targets that are generally seen as acceptable by the left (Reaganism and evangelical 
conservatism). By framing his argument as if it were about a confronting a specific 
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version of Reagan individualism, Lilla makes his appeal more persuasive to those on the 
left. By marking social movements like Black Lives Matter as hateful, petty, and 
individualistic in ways that are comparable to Reaganism and the Religious Right, Lilla 
crafts an argument for excluding and managing certain approaches to politics that is 
easily digested by left-of-center individuals and incorporated into their preexisting 
understandings of how contemporary American politics is structured. Lilla’s critique is 
able to displace real engagement with the social movements or issues of “identity” so 
persuasively because he frames his critique as one that is essentially about the right 
masquerading as the left. To put it another way, Lilla’s argument marks contemporary 
social movements and issues as essentially the same as the political right in the United 
States, thus making his desire to manage and eliminate certain political modes seem 
appealing to his audience, which is left-of-center and not sympathetic to the American 
right. 
 The desire to preserve a pristine and pure political commons against an impure 
and invading contagion that is not a participant in the political but instead an existential 
threat to the possibility of the political is what makes Lilla’s argument a eugenic analogy 
that is rhetorically framed for a left-of-center audience. Lilla’s critiques, although devoid 
of any mention of eugenics or genetics, rhetorically maps the political in an analogous 
way to the rhetorical mappings of eugenics and the silent majority; a pure and rationally 
superior group of individuals with a legitimate claim to leading the political (the 
genetically superior, the silent majority, and, for Lilla, the “citizen”) is (genetically or 
politically) endangered by an excessive minority that is read as absence that threatens the 
73 
 
future of civil society. This rhetoric, whether shot through the language of genetics, of 
majorities and minorities, or through political citizenship, produces a mandate to manage 
and eliminate the encroaching and excessive minority who threatens the “vast majority” 
with biological or political contamination. It is no coincidence that this reoccurring 
narrative, regardless of what particular parlance is used to articulate it, targets the same 
group of non-white, non-straight, and non-cisgender individuals every time.  
This is why I keep coming back to Wynter over and over again; this is 
fundamentally about genres of being in a political world that continuously reproduces an 
overdetermined genre of Man and his political mode that relies on rendering other 
potential genres of being and interacting with one another as irrational and dangerous to 
the majority of people and thus needing to be managed and eliminated. Chandan Reddy 
speaks to this kind of logic in his book Freedom with Violence, arguing that the state 
enacts of legitimate violence by claiming that it has the responsibility to eliminate 
irrational hate. Reddy writes that the state imagines itself as having an “ethical role of 
enforcing truly legitimate violence, of becoming the representative and material 
expression of that violence” and that “any violence not sanctioned by the state is 
characterized either as nonpolitical or antipolitical ‘hate,’ both conditions best addressed 
by medicine, psychology, or the military (all institutions that…have the capacity and 
authority for the eradication or annihilation of the offending hate)” (2011, pp. 11–12). 
This has quite a bit of resonance with Lilla’s claims about “identity politics” being a 
symptom of narcissism and that people who practice “identity politics” are hateful and 
petty in the same way an evangelical Christian would be. “Citizenship,” an identification 
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with the state, thus becomes the marker of rationality that must be defended against a 
hateful irrationality. Lilla’s framework for understanding politics, then, is a framework 
which marks certain modes of political being and labor (what Lilla names as “identity 
politics”) as in excess of political rationality (and actually subpolitical or antipolitical) 
and thus needing to be managed or eliminated. Furthermore, Lilla’s rendering of politics 
and specifically of “identity politics” as in excess of the political due to its irrationality 
corresponds to the “practices of hate” that Reddy identifies, noting that “the state has an 
obligation to eradicate, so that political society can remain free—in this way, the state 
delivers not a political violence against a political enemy, but a nonpolitical violence 
against the enemies of modern political society” (Reddy 2011, p. 12). Lilla sees identity 
politics as the “very limit of political society” and this figures it as an irrational and non- 
or sub- political threat to the very possibility of political society (Reddy, 2011, p. 12). 
Reddy helps us see here how Lilla is reproducing a dominant political trope in modern-
day liberal nations that functions to rationalize state violence by claiming to “properly” 
distribute it in the name of preserving political society. 
Reddy also discusses the positioning of the liberal state as the natural and rational 
basis for political change in his book. He writes that “the US nation-state continues to 
assert its form as the best possible totality for worldwide social relations” and that the 
liberal state is often positioned as “the final outcome of struggles for equality,” which 
Lilla does when he makes assertions that all political action must be focused upon 
government reform (2011, pp. 8, 37). Reddy uses the phrase “freedom with violence” to 
denote the ways in which state violence occurs through a “monopoly on rationality” that 
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is figured as a desire to define “rational freedom” as the “freedom from the threat of 
arbitrariness” (2011, p. 38). He also uses this phrase to gesture towards how visions of 
emancipation that remain tied to nation-state form and to identifications with it, such as 
citizenship, do not disturb notions that “legitimate violence” ought to be use by the state 
to eradicate “irrational practices and cultural expressions” (2011, pp. 38–39). This is 
precisely why Lilla’s critique (and other critiques like it) are both so resonant with liberal 
political understandings and so potentially dangerous; they are attached to a political 
imaginary that figures the state as the ideal representative of rational social forces that are 
authorized by their rationality to eliminate irrationality, which is almost always figured as 
individuals and political subjects who do not properly reproduce what is thought of as 
“proper society.” Reddy’s attention to the ways in which geopolitical competitors become 
rhetorically figured as moral and existential threats can be thought of in terms of 
Wynter’s genres, where other genres of human aren’t simply seen as competitors to Man 
but as an existential threat to Man and all who do properly comply with it. The rendering 
of those doing “identity politics” in Lilla’s eyes as threats to the very possibility of 
politics performs the exact kind of strategy that Reddy is highlighting, one that can’t 
consider “identity politics” to simply be another viewpoint or interest in a pluralist 
democratic system, but as a threat to democracy itself. 
Lilla’s understanding and figuring of the political as primarily a way of managing 
interests is also something that deserves to be examined. Political philosopher Jacques 
Rancière troubles the notion of politics as a kind of commons where people come to 
dispute their interests, which is exactly how Lilla imagines liberal society, i.e. as 
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“citizens” who come together in politics to dispute their rational interests about issues 
such as economics. Rancière, to the contrary, argues that: 
 
Politics does not exist because men, through the privilege of speech, place their 
interests in common. Politics exists because those who have no right to be 
counted as speaking beings make themselves of some account, setting up a 
community by the fact of placing in common a wrong that is nothing more than 
this very confrontation, the contradiction of two worlds in a single world: the 
world where they are and the world where they are not, the world where there is 
something "between" them and those who do not acknowledge them as speaking 
beings who count and the world where there is nothing. (1999, pp. 26–27) 
 
 
In other words, for Rancière, the political is not a conceptual commons where interests 
are debated, but the confrontation between the logic that claims to establish the political 
commons by properly accounting for all political subjects and those who exceed this 
account and are in fact, not counted. Rancière acknowledges that this is a very different 
account of politics than offered by most and proposes that the “organization of powers” 
that is usually referred to as politics be called the “police” instead (1999, p. 28). Rancière 
writes that when he uses “police” he is not so much referring to discipline necessarily, but 
more the “rules governing their [bodies] appearing, [and] a configuration of occupations 
and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed (1999, p. 29). 
Lilla’s image of the “citizen,” in addition to performing what Reddy terms a “freedom 
with violence,” also functions like what Rancière would call a police order, claiming to 
properly name all political subjects with nothing left over; subjects can have their 
identities, which are synonymous with interests, but they are all citizens first and most 
importantly. What “identity politics” actually does, in Lilla’s understanding and with 
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Rancières terminology, is disturb this order and call attention to the fact that the figure of 
the “citizen” cannot in fact account for all political subjects. 
 If the figure of the “citizen” cannot account for all political subjects and Lilla sees 
any attempt at disputing the count of the “citizen” by refusing it as a primary marker of 
political subjectivity as foreclosing on the possibility of politics, then his project may be 
termed one of “consensus democracy” as Rancière would term it. “Consensus 
democracy” or, more accurately, “postdemocracy” is the “conceptual legitimization of a 
democracy after the demos, a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, miscount, 
and dispute of the people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state 
mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests,” according to Rancière 
(1999, p. 102). If, as Lilla argues for, the image of the citizen is wholesale embraced as 
the basis for the political, this is exactly what would be achieved; no more miscounts or 
disputes about identity and belonging to the nation, just interests that are managed in their 
interplay by the state. Rancière notes that this is understood as a “reasonable agreement” 
that rests on the assumption that there is no gap between parties appearing at a dispute 
and parts of society, which Rancière rightfully calls “the disappearance of politics” 
(1999, p. 102). This is to say that what Mark Lilla is actually calling for by arguing for 
the abandonment of “identity politics” is the end of politics itself since identity is, in his 
imagination, articulated as a kind of non-identification with the state and with common 
political interest. Furthermore, Rancière notes that consensus democracy represents itself 
“as the world of law as opposed to the world of non-law, the world of barbaric identity, 
religion, or ethnicity,” thus fulfilling the opposition of rational and irrational that Reddy 
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highlights in his work(1999, p. 124, emphasis mine). Politics is, for Lilla, the end of 
politics and the wholesale embrace of the rational figure of the citizen that is to be 
defended through legitimate violence against the surplus irrationality of other 
identifications. 
In this chapter, I have engaged in a close reading of Lilla’s texts to show that his 
project is one that relies on a rhetorical mapping of the political that is analogous to the 
one produced by the logic of eugenics and the silent majority. In doing so, I highlight that 
these political moments are not isolated or unique, but in fact connected to a longer 
history of domination and subjugation that is invested in managing and eliminating 
certain modes of being. While eugenics is framed by the language of science, the “silent 
majority” by the language of politics and mathematics, and Lilla’s critique of “identity 
politics” by the language of citizenship and commonality, these understanding of the 
political all single out a kind of “villain” figure that is not just another political 
participant but an existential threat to the possibility of politics itself. These narratives 
justify and authorize the management and elimination of non-white and gender non-
normative individuals and modes of being. For eugenics, this is in the name of evolution 
and genetic progress; for the “silent majority,” this is in the name of the rights of the 
political majority; and for Lilla, this is in the name of a liberal, left-of-center future.  
Advocating for the management of these populations and their political 
expressions is clearly not isolated to one side or the other of the political spectrum and, in 
fact, seems to be becoming more and more prevalent on the left after the election of 
Donald Trump. For example, Amy Chua, a law professor at Yale, recently published a 
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book titled Political Tribes: Group Instinct and the Fate of Nations that forwards a 
similar thesis to Lilla’s, but shot through the language of international relations and citing 
a fear that “political tribalism” may pose a threat to the politics of the United States 
(2018). In her book, Chua explicitly compares the “tribalism” of the left (“identity 
politics”) with the “tribalism” of the right (racist nativism) and prescribes commonality 
and political moderation from minorities (such as not calling people racist for doing or 
saying racist things) as the solution to American social problems (2018). The growing 
trend of imagining the regulation of the political expressions of minorities as the solution 
to structural social problems and imagining political futures contingent upon this 
management reflects both an unwillingness to address the political structures (capitalism, 
white supremacy, systemic homophobia and transphobia) that produce the need for the 
social movements singled out by Lilla as well as a continuing trend of blaming minorities 
for holding back political and human progress.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE UNDERCOMMONS OF IDENTITY POLITICS 
Thus far in this thesis I have explored three technically distinct political and 
rhetorical strategies – eugenics, majoritarianism, and identity politics – to argue that, far 
from being discrete, these modes of understanding the political rely on a notion of a 
proper political genre of being. That is, all of these rhetorics imply there is a proper mode 
of interacting with the political and that maintaining this interaction and managing other 
interactions is necessary for the successful reproduction of the political. Furthermore, all 
of these logics rely to some degree on a notion of contamination – that a pure political 
past was recently compromised by impure and improper modes of being and that the fate 
of the society/nation/world is contingent upon the production of a once-again politically 
pure future. Temporality and more specifically futurity are at work in these political 
imaginaries that attempt to mobilize a vision of the future that is free from the excessivity 
of non-white, non-straight, and non-cisgender subjects so that the “real” work of politics 
(managing conflicts of rational interest between subjects capable of having them) can 
occur. 
Futurity as a mode of theorizing and approaching social problems, particularly 
from marginalized perspectives, has recently been taking up with great fanfare within
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interdisciplines such as women’s studies and American studies. However, as scholars like 
Lee Edleman have highlighted, futurity is not inherently liberatory and is not an all-
powerful conceptual tool that is the “answer” to contemporary issues in social thought, 
even when visions of the future are being produced by subjects understood as 
“minorities” (2004). Politically futurist imaginaries, even those produced by and put to 
work by minoritized subjects struggling against dominant genres of being, can still 
collapse into imperatives to regulate and manage certain kinds of life and establish pure 
conceptual spaces for the most deserving iterations of life that can travel under the sign of 
a minoritized identity signifier. Respectability politics and analyses that fix upon one axis 
of identity, for example, often fall into this futurist trap, establishing a new order within 
the already dominant order to delineate who among the minorities is most deserving, 
most competent, and/or most rational and thus most able to properly “represent” a 
minoritized community. This delineation is then mobilized in futurist terms, where then 
the imperative becomes to manage and correct individuals within the community with the 
understanding that solving the issues that face the community are fundamentally about 
changing the behavior of the community and managing the expressions it makes. More 
often than not, this leads to a doubling-down on the original structure of oppression, 
where the preferred behaviors are those that most align with the dominant ontological and 
epistemological structures and genres of being. 
In the concluding chapter of this project, I am interested in not just “looking 
forward” to a future where I assume things will be better because individuals are acting in 
more reasonable and rational ways, but more in “looking around” to see what political 
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practices are being mobilized to do work in the present and that are often misnamed as 
“identity politics” or “political correctness.” While I have already shown that signifiers 
like “identity politics” are suspect due to their reliance on eugenic-like thinking, my 
intention is not to “advocate for” the kinds of political labor that the term claims to refer 
to. In this chapter, I explore different kinds of political labor referred to by those 
signifiers and how they mobilize temporality in their political imaginaries. I argue that 
some iterations of minority politics can indeed be harmful, but not because, as those such 
as Lilla have argued, that they wrongfully dilute or disorganize a previously whole 
political sphere, but due to the fact that they tend to re-mobilize and re-inscribe eugenic-
like logics that are fundamentally invested in policing and proscribing patterns of 
behavior and modes of being that reinforce rather than struggle against the dominant 
genre of Man. In this chapter, I turn to scholars who give attention to supposedly 
“progressive” logics that invoke minorities and their texts as positive forces that 
nevertheless rely on similar tropes and similar understandings of the future as the ones I 
have focused on critiquing in this thesis. After reviewing these political logics, I turn to 
the concept of a “non-corrective” anti/politics to grapple with and account for those 
modes of politics that refuse to manage behavior and instead enact a critical political 
practice that refuses demands for purity and recognizes the anti/political work that is 
already-present and already-surrounding dominant modes of politics and being. Finally, I 
offer some concluding remarks and reflections on this thesis and how it fits into my 
overall academic project, as well as considering how political futurity and speculation 
may be mobilized as a driving impetus for the production and distribution of livable life. 
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Reductive Reiterations of Identity 
Rhetorical tropes like “political correctness” and “identity politics” have been in 
continuous use since the 1990s to refer to many different kinds of political labor and 
labor perceived as political. These terms assume their own accuracy and indeed assume 
that the kinds of labor they are referring to are similar enough to collapse under a single 
signifier, homogenizing phenomena as diverse as opposition to the Confederate battle 
flag, critiques of comedians like Jerry Seinfeld, social initiatives such as permitting trans 
individuals to use the bathroom that aligns with their gender, and social movements such 
as Black Lives Matter. This rhetorical flattening is one of the key effects of these 
signifiers that I find so problematic. In their desire to map the political as a struggle 
between proper and improper politics, they must necessarily collapse any number of 
diverse political moments together in order to make identity-based thought and 
movements seem more coordinated and thus more threatening than they really are. In this 
opposition to the rhetorical flattening of diverse political moments, I find it necessary to 
explicitly elaborate on those kinds of labor that can be called “identity politics” or 
“political correctness” that I do not find critical or helpful. That is to say, as part of my 
project of disturbing terms like “identity politics” and “political correctness” as those 
which misname political labor, I want to take the time to explain that I am not arguing for 
an understanding of the many different types of misnamed labor as inherently liberatory 
or critical. In other words, simply being “identity politics” to the eyes and ears of people 
like Mark Lilla does not make one inherently revolutionary; assuming so would perform 
the same rhetorical flattening that I am critiquing in this project. In this section, I want to 
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explore a few iterations and logical patterns of what could be called “identity politics” 
that are indeed problematic but not because they pose a threat to the political, as critics 
like Lilla imagine. To the contrary, they mobilize and reframe narratives very similar to 
those of Lilla and the eugenics movement in order to stake a claim to the political, 
ironically echoing the very social forces they claim to fight against. In categorizing and 
naming these patterns of political phenomena, I am not intending to imply that they are 
inherently and logically discrete; the logics these “types” of identity politics rely on often 
overlap and inform one another. 
The first of three patterns of “identity” I want to trouble in this section is a kind of 
essentialism that collapses minoritized subjects with their texts and assumes that any kind 
of text or utterance produced by a minoritized subject is fundamentally and properly 
authentic. This is a type of political logic that assigns a kind of blanket value to any 
statements or texts produced by subjects with marginal identities. This logic can be found 
in a wide range of contexts and across the political spectrum. What these examples have 
in common is an assumption that any and all statements made by those with marginal 
identities are politically valuable in that they reflect a supposed “authenticity” that 
insulates them from any kind of critique or critical engagement.  
A fairly explicit example of what I am discussing here emerges in a short op-ed in 
the New York Times titled “A Conservative Case for Identity Politics” by a self-
described conservative university professor named Jon Shields. Doing “identity politics” 
for Shields means explicitly laboring to have a diverse set of authors on his syllabi, a very 
common kind of academic labor that many critics of “identity politics” sneer at (2018). 
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However, Shields is not motivated by an egalitarian drive to correct long-standing 
citational practices that discount the work of marginalized scholars. Instead, he is 
motivated by his student’s own lack of reasoning and logic to consider arguments that 
they do not agree with and he has personally found that assigning students Black authors 
who, for example, “criticize hip-hop culture or defend white police officers,” are less 
likely to be dismissed as bigots because of their Blackness (2018). Shields laments that 
“the power of an argument should not depend on the person making it, nonetheless, it 
does,” and argues that humans are “hive-minded animals” and that his students are 
ultimately “partial, tribal beings — not rational automatons” (2018). Note here that 
Shields is making his argument by appealing to an image of his students (even as he 
claims to be speaking about all humans) as psychologically deficient and unable to 
properly and logically detach themselves from identity in order to read a text logically. 
His strategy to more or less trick his students into considering different viewpoints relies 
on an understanding of identity as a kind of essence and the idea that one who possesses 
this essence have some sort of essentially authentic claim to speak on behalf of this 
essence. 
Even though Shields’ choices can easily be called “identity politics” in that they 
fulfill a goal that is explicitly associated with identity, the way that identity is mobilized 
here is to essentially trick presumed non-rational students into engaging with ideas 
because someone with that identity produced those ideas. This logic, a mere rung above 
the oft-cited “but my friend who is Black/gay/trans says…” anecdote, plays out the same 
narrative of college students who lack reason and logic and, instead of offering correction 
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through critique, subtly attempts to exploit this supposed lack of reason to promote 
certain ideas and ideologies. In short, Shields mobilizes and promotes an essentialized 
notion of identity for the purposes of reasoning with those who cannot otherwise be 
reasoned with by presenting a token possessor of “identity” to advocate for a certain 
cause, thus insulating the cause from anti-racist, anti-homophobic, and anti-transphobic 
critique. This mobilization of “identity” is one we should be skeptical and critical of, 
even as it wants to be known as “identity politics.” 
Another, perhaps more subtle, mobilization of “identity” in an uncritical way that 
reproduces logics of pure and impure politics is highlighted and critiqued by Linda 
Martin Alcoff in her piece “The Problem of Speaking for Others.” In this piece, Alcoff 
argues that a trend in disciplines like women’s studies exists that dictates that certain 
people cannot “speak for others” because they are located in different identity categories. 
For example, this understanding plays out as something like “only Black individuals can 
speak for Black people” or “I can’t talk about trans* issues because I am not trans*.” 
Alcoff notes that identity is mobilized in a pointedly essentialized way in this logic, 
noting that it “[reduces] evaluation to a political assessment of the speaker’s location 
where that location is seen as an insurmountable essence that fixes one,  
as if one's feet are superglued to a spot on the sidewalk” (1992, p. 11). Alcoff also notes 
that such a logic implies that “one can retreat into one's discrete location and make claims 
entirely and singularly within that location that do not range over others, and therefore 
that one can disentangle oneself from the implicating networks between one's discursive 
practices and others' locations, situations, and practices” (1992, p. 13). What Alcoff 
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highlights here is a similar logic to the one deployed by Shields that considers the texts 
and utterance of those in a certain identity category about an issue that concerns their 
identity to be more true or authentic and thus more valid than others. Deploying identity 
in this way reinforces notions of liberal individualism and posits the notion that a proper 
politics is one that matches up certain statements (about identity) to “correct” subjects 
(those who have the identity), thus foreclosing on what Rancière would call the 
possibility for politics in favor of a police order where utterances are always already 
matched up to proper subjects. In this formulation, identity supports dominant systems of 
ordering and management, rather than troubling them. When identity is mobilized and 
understood in this way, the potential for appropriation and exploitation, as in Shields’ 
case, increases. 
Another pattern of invoking identity that remobilizes eugenic analogies and 
narratives of citizenship focuses more on creating a “respectable” version of an identity 
that is assumed to be reasonable, natural, and compatible with civilization and able to 
properly “represent” the identity, as opposed to others within the group whose practices 
of life are seen as degenerate and evidence of excess. Terrion Williamson writes about 
this in her critical examination of the beratement and eventual sacking of a radio host 
who referred to the women of the Rutgers women’s basketball team as “nappy-headed 
hos” on the basis that the Rutgers women were classy, talented, and articulate, and thus 
did not deserve to be labeled as such (2015). Williamson compares this to the relative 
lack of media coverage of a long line of serial murder cases involving Black women and 
posits that this may be because the murder victims were not respectable in the same way 
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as the Rutgers women and did have a greater proximity to the “nappy-headed ho” 
stereotype (2015). Extrapolating from this implicit act of valuing, Williamson writes that: 
 
What I did then and do now have some serious misgivings about, however, is a 
conceptualization of worthiness (e.g., what one deserves) that fundamentally 
relies upon the same formulation it is purportedly at odds with in order to make its 
case for itself. Here, the argument that proceeds along the line of unmitigated 
disavowal inherently functions to avow the very thing it purports to strain against, 
and the outraged claim that the Rutgers women were not nappy-headed hos 
suggested that it was not that particular configuration of terms that was the 
problem as much as it was that those particular women were being associated 
with it. (2015, p. 97) 
 
 
Williamson’s attention to a “conceptualization of worthiness” and the proper matching of 
terms with individuals and how this logic functions to “avow” the very reasoning it 
struggles against is exactly what I desire to highlight as a particularly problematic form of 
invoking identity, one that creates “proper” and “improper” classes of a minority subject 
based on acceptable standards of behavior and, in this specific case, proximity to a 
stereotype. The well-meaning attempt to use a proper identity (the Blackness of the 
Rutgers women’s basketball team) as a rationale to prevent the circulation of harmful 
texts (stereotypes about Blackness), in this case, actually mitigated larger structures of 
values attached to particular ontologies and ways of being in that they implied the lack of 
value of those who do bear proximity to the stereotype of the “nappy-headed ho.” What 
identity functions as in this case is a regulatory impetus, one that must necessarily 
devalue and push away certain unruly minority subjects in order to privilege a more 
proper, reasonable, and respectable subject. 
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 Another example of a similar kind of invocation of identity in as a justification for 
the further creation of “proper” and “improper” political subjects is the relatively 
successful proliferation of what scholars like Lisa Duggan call “homonormativity,” 
which posits a “proper” lifestyle and political subjectivity for gays and lesbians. Duggan 
connects the emergence of homonormativity to the proliferation of neoliberalism and 
culturalization of neoliberalism in the 1990s (2009).  Duggan uses Andrew Sullivan and 
Bruce Bauer, two gay men and theorists of a gay political center, as primary referents for 
what she is analyzing in her article. She notes that both take to attacking public displays 
of sexuality and advocate for a depoliticized understanding of sexuality that can pose no 
threat to the majority because sexuality is, by nature, involuntary and unchanging (2009). 
She even notes that Bauer specifically invoked the notion of “most gay people” being a 
part of a conventional and reasonable “silent majority” of Americans, as opposed to the 
rude and loud irrationality of Leftist “queerthink” (2009, p. 182) . The re-deployment of 
the “silent majority” framed through the terms of identity is not coincidental; it reflects 
the very same fundamental understanding of “most (gay) people” who are assumed to be 
reasonable and the proper representative subjects of their community being drowned out 
by loud, irrational, and angry minorities. This logic reinscribes notions of respectability 
and the proper performance of identity as a prerequisite for social value. 
Andrew Sullivan used a similar rhetorical strategy in what is now known as the 
first serious overture for gay marriage in The New Republic. In his essay, his rationale 
for supporting gay marriage is rooted in an opposition to the “abuse of already stretched 
entitlements” that domestic partnership offered, a creeping fear of the “social 
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disintegration” that not promoting marriage would allegedly engender, and the desire to 
create a “genuine public health measure” designed to push the “necessity” of “gay 
responsibility” in the “wake of the AIDS crisis” (1989). Despite the lucent conservative 
tropes present in Sullivan’s article, including the demission of social insurance (“already 
stretched entitlements”), gay-blaming for the AIDS crisis (“to be gay and to be 
responsible has become a necessity”), and the manifest pro-nuclear family complexion of 
the essay (marriage “would foster social cohesion, emotional security, and economic 
prudence”), this call for gay marriage (explicitly articulated as a way for gays to gain 
access to “an already established social convention”)  as the defining teleological 
objective of gay activism defined the way LGB folk across the political spectrum 
organized for the next two decades, demonstrating the political efficacy of this particular 
brand of “identity politics” (1989). 
Both of these examples show claims to identity being made by implicitly or 
explicitly devaluing another less “proper” or “civilized” iteration of that very identity. 
Whether its “nappy-headed hos” or sexually irresponsible queers, these deployments 
claiming to do work on behalf of an identity actually reinforce the very structures they 
otherwise claim to be resisting. This formulation of identity plays very well with concepts 
like “citizen” and “silent majority” in that they imagine a pure, rational, and apolitical 
identity that can easily be reconciled with already-dominant standards of being. Even 
though these claims are mobilized on behalf of “identity,” the underlying logic they 
mobilize is ultimately quite similar to the logic of eugenics and the genre of Man. 
Furthermore, they may be characterized as a kind of “freedom with violence” in that they 
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claim to protect reasonable, proper subjects from the illegitimate violence of racism and 
homophobia while deploying a legitimated form of racism and homophobia against 
supposedly irrational political subjects. In this formulation, racism and homophobia are 
wrong because they expose otherwise reasonable, upstanding citizens to violence, not 
because they partake in a fundamental ordering of society and the ascribing of value to 
that order. 
Another unsettling pattern of identity being invoked in a positive way for 
uncritical ends is when it is called up as a kind of consumable and depoliticized aesthetic 
that exists to provide a reasonable and valuable contrast to normativity in institutional 
and public spaces. Sara Ahmed addresses this in her study of diversity and diversity 
workers within institutions like the university, where diversity is assumed to be a non-
political and non-specific aesthetic of “good taste” that can manage difference effectively 
while providing value to the institution (2012). Ahmed writes that “the enjoyment of 
diversity is narrated as that which can take us beyond racism, which in turn is reduced to 
poor or bad taste... but if diversity is digestible difference, then other forms of difference 
become indigestible, as that which the organizational body cannot stomach” (2012, pp. 
69–70). This understanding of identity as something that possesses a consumable value in 
public or institutional spaces preserves the logics of property and a particular type and 
amount of identity as “proper” to certain spaces. By carving out a concept to mark 
“digestible” difference, logics of “diversity” can reproduce structures whereby some 
difference is seen as non-valuable and non-reconcilable to the institution, thus 
reproducing the same dilemma that critics Lilla, Nixon, and Robertson all claim to be 
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fighting against: a surplus of unreasonable (in the sense that the surplus is excessive and 
identity itself is without reason) difference communicated as identity.  
In highlighting these uncritical invocations of identity, I want to show how 
“identity” itself is not an inherently liberatory analytic, nor does it do anything by itself 
that actually challenges dominant logics or modes of belonging. Identity can just as easily 
be appropriated and reconfigured to fit dominant ideologies and ordering logics. Critics 
like Lilla actually overstate the efficacy of “identity” alone as an analytic that can 
challenge and de-order dominant social structures. As these examples demonstrate, 
“identity” as a concept is not inherently structured in such a way that it is always already 
critical of dominant social patterns. Treating identity as discrete and naturally-occurring 
and thus essentialized and non-political object that may be advocated for politically 
rather than as a relational process always already bound-up with politics, social structures 
and the violence those structures perpetuate keeps open the possibility of appropriation 
and redeployment by dominant social forces and structures. 
 
Politics Without Correction, Life Without Management 
What the previous examples all have in common is that they leave intact an 
understanding of politics as something other than and inherently separate from identity, 
which is assumed to be natural and a simple fact of life. Thus, while it may logically be 
an object of politics, it cannot ever be a proper ground for politics. These examples 
imagine futures where identity and politics are not necessarily connected because identity 
groups are self-regulated, only speak on behalf of what they already are, and add an 
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amount of “good taste” to social and institutional life. What I find compelling are not 
these formulations of identity and politics, but alternate understandings of an “identity 
politics” that acknowledges the necessary and ongoing enmeshment of these two terms. 
In this section, I explore what a desirable “identity politics” may look like that does not 
rely on logical structures that must necessarily reproduce social structures of subjugation.  
As already discussed, the political labor referred to pejoratively by signifiers like 
“identity politics” is both misnamed and miscategorized with deployments of identity that 
are uncritical and reinforce dominant social structures. Those like Mark Lilla and Wilmot 
Robertson based their theories of the political on the notion that individuals possessing 
certain identities posed an existential threat to the proper reproduction of the political and 
society at large. Although I have troubled these arguments by closely examining their 
logics and placing them within a larger context of social domination as well as troubled 
the notion that “identity” possesses some inherent liberatory or critical potential, I would 
not characterize my desired project as one that seeks to “do away” with identity or decry 
all invocations of “identity politics” as either pejorative rhetorics or uncritical politics. In 
this section of my thesis, I want to “play” with the concept of identity and speculate about 
what identity might do to the political and vice-versa. My intention is not to offer a 
normative prescription for what politics should be, but instead to probe and explore 
alternatives conceptions of both identity and politics that trouble the overdetermined 
genre of Man that Wynter identifies, that keeps performing the miscount (and perhaps 
questions why one needs to be counted) posed by Rancière, and that refuses the freedom 
with violence that Reddy identifies and analyzes. In short, I am playing with both 
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“identity” and “politics” and asking what may come of either/both of them if we shift our 
current notions of ontological and epistemological horizons of possibility. 
For this section, I choose to consult the Combahee River Collective Statement as 
my primary source. I do this for several reasons, some more related to the formal logics 
of this particular and specific project and some more personal and reflective of my 
ongoing general scholarly project and my own affective investment in it. On the one 
hand, I am motivated to make the Statement a site of resistance and political theory in 
direct contrast to those like Lilla, who use it as a referent for “fraudulent politics” and 
wish to discount its impact and significance as a work of political and social theorizing. 
On the other, the Statement is one of the very first texts I read in my introduction to 
women’s and gender studies course, one of the very first I assigned when I taught that 
very course two years later, and one that I find myself coming back to over and over 
again in my scholarly work. The way the Statement theorizes identity and politics 
together as an “identity politics” is very different from what Lilla claims it to be and how 
“identity” is mobilized in the uncritical ways in which I described in the previous section. 
Furthermore, the Statement was published within a few years of Robertson’s The 
Dispossessed Majority and around the time of Nixon’s ascent to political influence, 
making it a source that is in many direct and indirect ways responding to the social forces 
I have taken up in this thesis project. In performing a close reading of this text, I hope to 
gesture both to the ways in which this document resists Lilla’s reading of it and 
Robertson’s notion of the political produced in a similar temporal moment in addition to 
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the ways it remains a text, a theory, and an archive of speculative politics and political 
futures that are committed to already-existing life that is not in need of correction. 
In addition to the Combahee River Collective Statement, I also use Fred Moten’s 
and Stefano Harney’s The Undercommons as a sort of companion piece to the Statement 
in this section. Moten’s and Harney’s project is very concerned with re-defining long-
standing conceptions about what the political is and how it functions, and I believe their 
project converses well with the Statement and that both works inform one another in 
important ways. I want to emphasize here that I am reading The Undercommons 
alongside the Statement and not using it as a lens through which to “read” the Statement, 
which would privilege The Undercommons while objectifying the Statement, which is 
exactly the type of work I am trying to avoid. Instead, I am thinking these pieces as in 
conversation and studying (a concept found both in the Statement and Moten’s and 
Harney’s work) with one another. In connecting these two projects, I hope to demonstrate 
that the Black feminist and the Black radical traditions are offering alternate visions of 
politics, polity, and belonging that are not necessarily predicated on notions of purity, 
contamination, and, ultimately, the dominant genre of Man. 
The first important strand of thought in the Statement I want to examine is the 
willingness to maintain the tension between the anti-Black and anti-woman basis of the 
political and the necessity of continuing to do political work and be involved in politics. 
The Statement’s oft-cited quote on identity politics states that “This focusing upon our 
own oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics. We believe that the most 
profound and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as 
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opposed to working to end somebody else's oppression” (Combahee River Collective, 
1977). As cited as this quote may be, presenting it outside of the context of the full 
Statement can be misleading because of the way the Statement conceives both “identity” 
and “politics.” “Identity” in the statement is never conceived of as something separate 
from the political sphere that provides a “pure” ground from which to speak or perform 
political action. Instead, the Statement acknowledges that “the synthesis of these [racial, 
sexual, heterosexual, and class] oppressions creates the conditions of our lives,” 
highlighting racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class identity as the products of the 
interaction between life and social structures of oppression (Combahee River Collective, 
1977). “Identity” is not a pre-existing quality in the statement, as some like Lilla have 
read it, but instead the “condition” of life produced and reproduced by interactions with 
social structures. This relationship then leads to an “extremely negative relationship” 
between Black women and the American political system (Combahee River Collective, 
1977). This understanding of identity is important because it highlights the necessary and 
continuous enmeshment of identity and politics and that there can be no “pure” refuge in 
identity on which to base a politics, made clear by the Statement’s rejection of lesbian 
separatism. In short, the Statement conceives of identity as a relationship between 
subjects and sociopolitical structures, rendering any kind of “identity” work as always 
already in relationship to systems of social oppression and domination. 
However, the “extremely negative relationship” that Black women have to the 
political is not used as a ground to advocate for the abandonment of the political or of 
political work. To the contrary, the Statement acknowledges and commits to various 
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types of political work, such as workplace organizing and setting up rape crisis centers. 
The necessary antagonism between the political and Black women is not conceived of as 
a rationale for abandoning political work or disowning other political groups. Instead, the 
Statement acknowledges that struggling with others against political forces while also 
struggling against those same others (as in the case of Black men specifically) is a 
necessary result of the “pervasiveness of our oppression” and a necessary condition of 
political work (Combahee River Collective, 1977). The Statement, while putting forth a 
vision of a Black feminist identity politics, never conceives of this as a politics of purity 
that is located somewhere other than the political sphere from which it can critique it 
without being involved or in relation to it. To put it another way, the Statement 
understands “identity politics” not as politics emerging purely out of an individualized 
and ultimately apolitical identity, but as always enmeshed with the political, requiring 
different types of work that may necessarily have some level of contradiction. 
The enmeshment of subjugated individuals within institutions and political arenas 
that they are fundamentally antagonistic towards is discussed by Moten and Harney in 
their text. They write that politics and the commons is always co-existent with the 
surround and the undercommons, noting that “politics is an ongoing attack on the 
common – the general and generative antagonism – from within the surround” (2013, p. 
13). They discuss the relationship between the subjugated and the commons further, 
writing: 
 
The false image and its critique threaten the common with democracy, which is 
only ever to come, so that one day, which is only never to come, we will be more 
than what we are. But we already are. We’re already here, moving. We’ve been 
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around. We’re more than politics, more than settled, more than democratic. We 
surround democracy’s false image in order to unsettle it. Every time it tries to 
enclose us in a decision, we’re undecided. Every time it tries to represent our will, 
we’re unwilling. Every time it tries to take root, we’re gone (because we’re 
already here, moving). We ask and we tell and we cast the spell that we are under, 
which tells us what to do and how we shall be moved, here, where we dance the 
war of apposition. We’re in a trance that’s under and around us. We move through 
it and it moves with us, out beyond the settlements, out beyond the 
redevelopment, where black night is falling, where we hate to be alone, back 
inside to sleep till morning, drink till morning, plan till morning, as the common 
embrace, right inside, and around, in the surround. (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 19) 
 
 
The focus that Moten and Harney give in their project to the “surround” is their way of 
reconciling the sometimes contradictory labor necessary for survival that often means 
working with and for institutions like the university that perpetuate violence and 
colonization while also opposing those processes and working to end them from within 
the insitituion through a variety of subversive practices. They liken this to “stealing” from 
the insitituion and propose this formulation as a way out of the “do we stay or do we go” 
issue that plagues so much of social organizing thought (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 26). 
For Moten and Harney – as well as the Collective – this choice is not necessary or a 
determinant of action. For both texts, political subjects can occupy the space of the 
political and of institutions while subverting and resisting them within the undercommons 
and the surround. 
Another important strand of thought in the Statement is the articulation of mutual 
belonging and love for one another for what one already is as the basis for political 
belonging, as opposed to a type of belonging that specifies correction as the basis for 
community. Moten and Harevy discuss “correction” as the general thrust of politics and 
policy at length, writing that “we won’t stand corrected. Moreover, incorrect as we are 
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there’s nothing wrong with us. We don’t want to be correct and we won’t be corrected. 
Politics proposes to make us better, but we were good already in the mutual debt that can 
never be made good” (2013, p. 20). In other words, the ways in which we are already 
living and practicing life are sufficient and valuable and should not be made to conform 
to ideas of “correctness.” This stands in clear opposition to reductive notions of identity 
and properly matching behaviors and utterances to specific and correct identity 
categories. The project Moten and Harney pursue in their text is one that wants to 
imagine what belonging may look like without the mediation of politics, accounting, or 
management. They propose “study” as an alternative mode of belonging and knowledge 
production which does not presume interest or knowledge as a means to an end that can 
be quantified and use the concept of debt without credit (“We owe each other the 
indeterminate. We owe each other everything”) as a way of thinking about belonging that 
refuses quantification and counting altogether (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 20). 
The Statement pursues a similar project of belonging, declaring that “our politics 
evolve from a healthy love for ourselves, our sisters and our community which allows us 
to continue our struggle and work,” establishing an affective relationship that is rooted in 
an already-present admiration of one another as the basis for their political relationship. 
This, along with the Statement’s concern with not “messing people over” in the name of 
politics, establishes the Statement’s politics as one that is attached to already-present 
forms of life and living, rather than trying to imagine a correctional politics that is 
fundamentally concerned with “correcting” life, as Moten and Harney note is the thrust 
behind politics and policy (Combahee River Collective, 1977). The reason I find this so 
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important is because it reconfigures our understandings of what the political may be. 
Those like Lilla, who imagine “citizenship” as a kind of eternal standard of public and 
civic life that ought to guide the “correction” and “progression” of political belonging, 
participate in a project that is invested in that struggle of genres that Wynter identifies. 
Works like the Statement imagine political change, work, and engagement without ever 
necessarily calling for the “correction” of certain kinds of life or belonging. There are no 
normative demands for certain behaviors, performance, or patterns of life to be enacted; 
the thrust of the Statement is to carve out a political vision that is about co-habitation and 
mutual love even while entangled in violent political systems. This, alongside the 
Statement’s own use of “study” as a mode of belonging and imagining political action, is 
a significant participation in and reconfiguration of the political as it is currently 
imagined.  
The final strand of thought I wish to examine closely is the acknowledgement that 
Black women disrupt the “call to order” (as Moten and Harney would call it) of 
conventional socio-political movements, and how the Statement privileges non-
hierarchical modes of being and (non-)organization whilst also making an important and 
convincing call to political action to change social structures of racism and sexism. 
Moten and Harney discuss ordering and legibility in the terms of NGOs in their text, 
writing that: 
 
…the true ethos of the NGO is not to speak for a group that’s not speaking, but to 
somehow provoke that group to speak for itself. It’s all about, ‘this group has to 
find its voice and speak up for itself against the dam, and this kind of thing.’ On 
the one hand, you think, ‘well, fuck, what else could you do? I mean, you’ve gotta 
fight the dam.’ On the other hand, it does seem to me that you’re asking people to 
101 
 
call themselves into a certain form of identity… But there are always elaborations 
of social life that are not comprehended or exploited by capital. Capital, in its 
agency, just doesn’t get it, necessarily. Governance is a way to make it more 
legible to them in certain ways… that in order to be recognizable, you have to 
answer the call to order – and that the only genuine and authentic mode of living 
in the world is to be recognizable within the terms of order (2013, pp. 124–125) 
 
 
Moten and Harney’s understanding here is that governance and the political requires 
participating individuals to be legible and ordered in a specific way. They go on to use 
the example of a teacher in a classroom using a “call to order” to organize the classroom 
for proper knowledge production, which they argue presumes that the pre-ordered 
classroom cannot be a site of study, planning, or proper belonging (Harney & Moten, 
2013, p. 126). In other words, the presumption of the political is that order and legibility 
are prerequisites to political labor, similar to how Lilla establishes “citizenship” as the 
basic ordering identification of the properly political. Furthermore, Moten and Harney 
speculate about what may occur if calls to order are refused and what kind of work that is 
usually foreclosed upon by demands for legibility and order might proliferate in their 
absence. To put it another way, Moten and Harney are asking what is lost when we call 
for order and what types of labor and study cannot be ordered in certain contexts. 
In a similar vein, the Statement acknowledges in several ways how Black women 
are often forced to “correct” themselves in the face of various “calls to orders” and what 
kind of work those orderings foreclose upon. In some places, the Statement even goes 
farther than that, noting that it is “difficult even to announce in certain contexts that we 
are Black feminists” (Combahee River Collective, 1977). The Statement acknowledges 
the invisibility of Black women in the larger political sphere and the call to order it issues 
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while also highlighting the nested call to orders that occur within sociopolitical groups. 
The Statement highlights how “the reaction of Black men to feminism has been 
notoriously negative” and that Black women, especially Black women naming 
themselves as feminist, are seen as agents of division, interrupting a pure “Black 
struggle” and inhibiting its growth (Combahee River Collective, 1977). The assertions 
out of male-dominated Black nationalist groups that locate the Black woman as the 
natural counterpart to the Black man in the realm of the home that the Statement 
highlights should be read as a kind of “call to order,” one that interrupts study between 
and among Black women in favor of enforcing a corrective prescription for how bodies 
and belonging ought to be organized. The Statement acknowledges the disruption of 
Black feminism to this call to order and corresponds to the excess of study and work that 
Moten and Harney note is cut off when calls to order are issued as the basis for producing 
a proper common arena in which to speak and organize. 
To summarize my observations here, I am reading the Statement as a work of and 
from the undercommons of politics, an undercommons that occupies the same conceptual 
space as the political while working with and against it in complex ways. The 
Statement’s emphasis on continuous involvement with the political, its recognition of 
affective belonging without correction, and its understanding that its very existence is in 
excess of various nested calls to order makes the Statement not only a work of politics 
but a work that reimagines what politics may look like outside of eugenic orderings of 
life, majoritarian claims to proper leadership, or supposedly universal political 
imaginaries such as the “citizen.” Furthermore, the complex ways in which the Statement 
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understands identity make it a sort of “undercommons” of what is usually understood as 
the intersections of identity and politics, in that it labors at this intersection while also 
subverting and reconfiguring how “identity and politics” are usually thought. 
This thesis serves as a nodal point in my ongoing work to understand and 
interrogate how those outside of the dominant genre of Man interact with the political, 
that “complex sum of human relations,” what forms those interactions take, and what 
those interactions make possible. In performing this work and crafting this text, I hope to 
provide both a means by which to respond to dominant political logics that govern and 
manage how minoritized subjects interact with the political sphere in addition to 
beginning a longer project of imagining what the political may look like without these 
logics. 
In addition to this proper, “scholarly” purpose, this thesis has also served a less 
proper purpose, which has been to enrich and texture my personal understanding of how I 
relate to the political and how I communicate that relationship to others. Over the months 
of working on this project, I have watched my words leap off of the page and into my 
day-to-day life in surprising and often uncomfortable ways. I have found myself 
quarreling with friends, family, co-workers, and academic peers on many of the issues 
and topics I have raised in this thesis and I have often been asked to justify my insistence 
that identity ought to be considered as inextricably political, even if that consideration is 
seen as too alienating or too difficult to bear for those who are not forced to consciously 
consider their identity in their relationship to politics, the commons, and/or public space 
in general. Doing this labor and assembling this work was not only difficult because of 
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the academic labor involved, but also because of the very present affective investment I 
have in figuring these questions out. I hope that this work will serve as a reference point 
for anyone faced with these very powerful and dominant logics, whether that be in a 
classroom, across a dinner table, or at the other end of state-sanctioned violence. 
The archive of frustration that motivated the creation of this work and my overall 
scholarly project continues to grow. I am still frustrated with politics, with the university, 
and with many people in my life who cannot see what I do or what others do without 
coming to know and mark that labor as “identity politics.” However, in doing the work 
for this project, I am also filled with a kind of hope that recognizes that resistance can 
travel under many names and occupy an undercommons that is always with and against 
those identifications. In doing this work, I am reminded that politics is, quite literally, 
always already surrounded by what exceeds it, and it is in this surrounding that my hope 
is located. Projects, ideologies, and rhetorics of extermination and violence have the 
capacity to do incredible harm, but the resilience of those that steal away into that 
surround to produce other genres of life is what this project and my larger academic 
trajectory is anchored in. “Identity politics” or not, the work and hard labor of living 
other kinds of life is being done, even if it isn’t always visible to the majority, citizenship, 
management, policy, and the “properly” political. I am frustrated and I struggle, but 
nonetheless I live on in the surround, stealing as much as I can from politics and 
hopefully putting it to good use.
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Figure 1. Search Term Comparison Graph 
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